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I. INTRODUCTION
The law relating to private remedies available under rule 10b-
51 is confused.2 Commentators list up to a dozen separate measures
of recovery that prospective plaintiffs may pursue if defrauded in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.3 Courts mix and
match these measures in a way that both obscures their substan-
tive and historical backgrounds and creates difficulty for subse-
quent courts and scholars seeking a coherent body of law. The
"catch-all" nature of the rule encourages an ad hoc approach by
which a court provides the most appropriate remedy under the cir-
cumstances;4 but this approach also fosters a misunderstanding of
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material act or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated the rule in 1942 to implement
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). That section
provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est or for the protection of investors.
2. Courts in the three decades after the rule's enactment concentrated on whether the
rule allowed a private cause of action to be implied, and the elements necessary for finding
liability. See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. The courts seldom needed to address
the measure of plaintiff's recovery until after the resolution of these threshold questions,
leaving undeveloped the issue of remedy. See, e.g., Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp.
740, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Although a multitude of cases now have addressed the measure of
recovery, courts have used such a variety of approaches that the uncertainty is greater than
when no cases at all existed. See infra note 18 for a brief description of the historical devel-
opment of the implied cause of action under the rule.
3. 5C A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10b-5 11-122-23 (2d ed. 1983).
Professor Loss lists a general rule qualified by eight "voracious exceptions." See L. Loss,
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1132-41 (1983).
4. See, e.g., Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 1982); Nye v. Blyth
Eastman Dillion & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1198 (8th Cir. 1978); Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107,
111 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Cobine, Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule lob-
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the rule's remedies, as illustrated by the variety of sometimes in-
consistent descriptions of the same case.5
The primary practical difference among the measures of recov-
ery in rule 10b-5 cases is how they allocate between the parties the
post-transaction change in the value of the transferred securities.
Securities by nature fluctuate in value; by the time a court decides
that relief is appropriate in a fraud case the securities may be
worth more or less than the amount paid for them in the transac-
tion. Only part of this change in value may be due to the misrepre-
sentations; other factors, such as general movement in the stock
market since the transaction, also contribute to a fluctuation in
value. Some remedies, like those termed "out of pocket," allow a
plaintiff to recover only for the harm resulting from the misrepre-
sentation itself and exclude any additional harm caused by a
change in the market or some other factor that was not the proxi-
mate consequence of the fraud.' In contrast, a remedy based on
rescission allows the plaintiff to unwind the transaction and re-
cover the entire purchase price, even though this may permit the
plaintiff to escape a bargain that was bad independent of the
fraud.7
Recent decisions in securities cases evidence a trend toward a
result that combines elements of both out of pocket and rescission
theories. Courts increasingly are awarding the victim of fraud-the
plaintiff-the difference between the value of what he gave up,
measured at the time of the transaction, and the value of what he
received, measured at a reasonable time after discovery of the
fraud.' This intermediate approach allows a victim to place upon a
5 Actions, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 651, 682 (1972).
5. For example, courts citing the well-known case Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965), have described its measure of recovery as based on
the following theories: benefit of the bargain, Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402,
415 (3d Cir. 1973); out of pocket, Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 170 n.13 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974); modified out of pocket,
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 747 (8th Cir. 1967); an exception to the out of pocket rule,
Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 1982); "rescission measure of damages,"
Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980, 990 (E.D. Pa. 1969); unjust enrichment,
Rude v. Cambell Square, 411 F. Supp. 1040, 1050 (D.S.D. 1976); and windfall profits,
Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 589 (3d Cir. 1975).
6. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
8. Compare the cases discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 47-60, which ap-
ply the modified out of pocket approach, with the cases discussed in the text accompanying
infra notes 61-79, which use a rescissory approach, and with SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47
(1st Cir. 1983), discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 150-67. See Recent Develop-
ment, Damages for Insider Trading in the Open Market: A New Limitation on Recovery
19841
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defrauding defendant the risk of any change in the market until a
reasonable time after the discovery of the fraud, but not beyond.
As in earlier rule 10b-5 cases, however, courts are reaching this re-
medial result without a clear understanding of the substantive
foundation for the measure of recovery.
The thesis of the Article is that much of the confusion about
rule 10b-5 remedies turns on the courts' failure to recognize ade-
quately that the rule derives from two separate and independent
sources at common law. Rule 10b-5 draws primarily on tort con-
cepts that focus on harm to the plaintiff and limit recovery by
principles of legal causation. In addition, the rule, like common-
law fraud, traces its lineage to principles based on unjust enrich-
ment. This second source focuses on the defendant's gain and re-
quires the defendant to return all benefit received through the
fraudulent transaction, even if that gain exceeds plaintiff's loss.
Recovery under rule 10b-5 sometimes is supported by tort princi-
ples, sometimes supported by unjust enrichment principles, and
sometimes by both.
In many transactions, the tort focus on plaintiff's loss does not
produce a different result from the unjust enrichment focus on de-
fendant's gain. In some transactions, however, the results will not
be the same. In those cases when a different result does occur, a
court's recognition of unjust enrichment as an independent legal
basis for recovery permits the plaintiff to recover the gain, even if
he has not suffered an equivalent loss. Courts that fail to distin-
guish the difference in the underlying rationale improperly at-
tempt to apply tort limitations to recoveries based on unjust en-
richment. The unjust enrichment remedy, which compensates
victims of misrepresentations and also deters potential defendants
from engaging in fraudulent activity, is particularly suited to the
federal securities laws that have both compensatory and deterrent
purposes.
This Article traces the unjust enrichment heritage of rule 10b-
5 and discusses circumstances in which courts should apply those
principles. Part II identifies the sources that courts utilize to deter-
Under Rule 10b-5, 34 VAND. L. REv. 797, 812-13 (1981).
The American Law Institute's proposed Federal Securities Code adopts a similar ap-
proach. FEDERAL SECURrrIEs CODE §§ 1703, 1708 (Proposed Official Draft 1980). The Code
provides for both rescission and damages, but the two remedies usually produce the same
mathematical result. Under either remedy the defendant usually bears the risk of any
change in the market until a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud. See id. § 1708
introductory comment.
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mine the defendant's obligation in cases of securities fraud. Part
III of this Article considers the available measures of recovery in
10b-5 actions based on tort principles. Part IV discusses remedies
based on unjust enrichment/restitution. Finally, this Article in part
V outlines the limitations on the availability of the unjust enrich-
ment remedy.9
II. SOURCES OF THE DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATION IN CASES OF
SECURITIES FRAUD
Fraud in a securities transaction can create obligations stem-
ming from three separate but overlapping areas of the law. This
may be illustrated in a typical simple transaction in which a de-
fendant's misrepresentation of the characteristics of a security in-
duces a plaintiff to purchase the security. First, the falsity of the
representations in some situations could constitute a breach of
warranty and thus a breach of the contract of sale. A plaintiff
could sue for contract damages based on his expectancy, seeking to
be put in the position he would have been in had the defendant
performed under the contract. 0 Second, the misrepresentation
may be a wrong for which tort law will provide a remedy in dam-
ages. Recovery under this theory would reflect the general pur-
poses of tort law-compensating plaintiff for any harm caused by
the wrong and returning plaintiff to his pretransaction position."
9. This Article accepts unjust enrichment as an appropriate measure of recovery in
fraud cases, but does not seek to compare the various measures of recovery in their effects
on economic efficiency, which would be an entirely separate article. The increased applica-
tion of economic analysis to legal issues that has become widespread in academic legal writ-
ing in recent years also has touched this area of the law. See, e.g., Fischel, Use of Modern
Finance Theory, 38 Bus. LAW. 1, 17 (1982); Mather, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of
Contract: The Case of the Partially Performing Seller, 92 YALE L.J. 14, 21-28 (1982). Eco-
nomic theory well may affect the particular kinds of cases in which unjust enrichment is
viewed as appropriate, but it should not affect the basic point of this Article, which is that
courts should understand the independence of the two bases of obligations underlying rule
10b-5.
10. See generally 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 992 (1964). The limits on a contract ac-
tion involving a securities purchase are discussed infra note 20 and accompanying text. A
plaintiff in a breach of contract suit may seek alternatives to damages such as specific per-
formance or rescission. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 377 comment a (1979).
The purpose of contract damages recovery is to put the plaintiff in a position equivalent to
where he would have been if the defendant had performed the contract. Hawkins v. McGee,
8 N.H. 114, 117, 146 A. 641, 643 (1929). This Article sometimes refers to the principles that
support this remedy as expectancy principles to distinguish them from the unjust enrich-
ment principles that support recoveries labelled restitution.
11. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 110 (4th ed. 1971); see also D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 9.2 (1973).
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Last, courts recognize that defendant's misrepresentation creates
an obligation based upon principles of unjust enrichment, often
described under the heading of restitution."2 Unlike tort principles
that look to the harm to the plaintiff, restitution uses the benefit
to the defendant as the basis of the obligation, characterizing the
benefit obtained through a fraudulent transaction as unjust
enrichment. 3
Fraud cases are confusing because more than one of these
three historical bases of obligations may support an award in the
same factual situation and may result in the same recovery for the
plaintiff. The harm measured by what the plaintiff gave up often
equals both the profit the plaintiff expected to make on the con-
tract and the defendant's gain from the transaction, as the follow-
ing example illustrates: Plaintiff is induced by misrepresentations
to pay $10,000 to defendant for securities that would be worth
$10,000 if they had the qualities represented by defendant, but in
fact lack those qualities and are worthless. In this case plaintiff's
loss (the $10,000 cash) equals plaintiff's expectancy (securities
worth $10,000) and also defendant's gain ($10,000 cash), so the
plaintiff's recovery will be the same, regardless of which theory a
court uses.
In some situations, however, the amount of recovery may de-
pend on which theory a court chooses to apply. Plaintiff may have
made a good bargain in paying $10,000 for securities that would in
fact be worth $15,000 if they had the characteristics represented by
defendant. Under a contract measure of damages that sought to
provide plaintiff with the benefit of his bargain, plaintiff would re-
ceive $15,000. This is $5000 more than he would recover under a
tort damages remedy that would give him $10,000 to return him to
the position he occupied prior to the transaction. Another differ-
ence in the measure of recovery is illustrated when defendant by
12. The ordinary meaning of restitution does not by itself accurately convey the
breadth of this basis of obligation. The dictionary definition suggests restoration to a plain-
tiff of something plaintiff once had. The law of restitution instead focuses on the unjust
enrichment of the defendant, which usually returns plaintiff to his previous position, but
sometimes goes further and puts the plaintiff in a better position if necessary to prevent the
unjust enrichment of the defendant. The early drafts of the Restatement of Restitution
were titled Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment; the shortening of the title
that occurred after American Law Institute approval did not indicate a departure from the
emphasis on unjust enrichment. The tendency of courts, however, to use the dictionary
meaning of restitution to limit the body of law has led to much confusion in rule 10b-5
cases. See infra part IV.
13. See generally 1 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.1, at 1 (1978).
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misrepresentation induces plaintiff to sell for fifty dollars stock
worth sixty dollars and whichdefendant is able to resell for seventy
dollars after a rise in the stock market. Plaintiff's loss in tort lim-
ited by traditional principles of proximate cause may be only ten
dollars while defendant's gain is twenty dollars. The amount of re-
covery thus depends on which basis of obligation is present in each
case.
14
Rule 10b-5 relies on each of these bases of obligations to vary-
ing degrees. The rule is a general antifraud provision that prohibits
misrepresentations, omissions, or other fraudulent activity in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of securities. While neither the
rule nor the statute from which it comes expressly provides for a
private cause of action for persons injured by the prohibited con-
duct, 15 courts have been willing to imply a private remedy for more
than thirty-five years.'6 Today the existence of this implied remedy
is "simply beyond peradventure.'
1 7
Because the rule 10b-5 cause of action is implied, courts have
had no express guidance in determining the appropriate measure
of recovery for a violation of the rule. Courts have been free to
choose one of the three categories of remedy and tailor the mea-
sure of recovery to comply with the principles of the selected rem-
edy. Tort concepts have been the dominant theory shaping the
measure of recovery, in large part because courts used tort theory
as the primary basis for implying the private right of action.' s Al-
14. Each of the different bases of obligation may not apply to all misrepresentations.
Misrepresentations may exist when there is no contract or defendant has received no bene-
fit, but defendant nevertheless should be responsible for the foreseeable harm caused to
plaintiff. If the misrepresentation is innocent, a court may compel a defendant to return
what was exchanged in the transaction but not hold the defendant responsible for any addi-
tional harm that plaintiff may have suffered because of the misrepresentation.
15. The SEC initially intended to use the rule to seek injunctive action against an
insider who purchased stock from shareholders without disclosing certain favorable informa-
tion. See Comments of Milton V. Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal Se-
curities Laws, (Nov. 18 & 19, 1966) 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967).
16. The decision of the federal district court in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), was the first to allow the private cause of action.
17. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S. Ct. 683, 687 (1983).
18. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), the first case to
find an implied right of action under rule 10b-5, relied on the tort principle that "[tihe
disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort." Id. at 513 (citing RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1939)). Other approaches rely on § 29 of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982). See infra note 69. The Supreme Court in J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), found an implied cause of action under the proxy provi-
sions of the 1934 Act on a general theory that the court may fashion any appropriate rem-
edy for the violation of a federal right. Fifteen years later the Court discounted the tort
theory in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); "[The] argument in favor of
1984]
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though unjust enrichment principles are evident in a fewer number
of rule 10b-5 cases, there has been a steady flow of such cases dat-
ing from the earliest rule 10b-5 decisions. 9 The expectation princi-
ples of contract law have not provided an independent basis for
rule 10b-5 recovery in part because the misrepresentation may not
be contained in an express warranty and because the Uniform
Commercial Code does not recognize any implied warranties of
value for investment securities.20 These expectation based princi-
ples, however, have had a strong indirect influence in shaping the
measure of recovery for the tort out of pocket recovery, as dis-
cussed in part III. The remainder of this Article therefore focuses
on tort principles measuring harm to the plaintiff and unjust en-
richment principles measuring gain to the defendant.
III. TRADITIONAL RULE 10b-5 REcOVERY-REMEDIES BASED ON
TORT
A. Out of Pocket Damages
Out of pocket damages are the usual form of relief available
for a rule 10b-5 violation.21 This measure awards the victim of
fraud the difference between the price the victim paid (or the con-
sideration transferred) and the actual value that the victim re-
ceived in the transaction." The out of pocket measure, borrowed
implication of a private right of action based on tort principles, therefore, is entirely mis-
placed." Id. at 568. While the Court since Borak has followed a stricter standard for impli-
cation of a private cause of action, the rule lob-5 implied claims have survived. The analogy
to tort law also continues since many courts consider the implied cause of action to be "es-
sentially a tort claim." See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555 (5th
Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983) (quoting Moody v. Bache &
Co., 570 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1978)).
19. See infra notes 61-101 and accompanying text.
20. See U.C.C. §§ 2-105(1), 8-306(2) (1977).
21. See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1133-34.
22. Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1974); Estate Counseling Ser-
vice, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962);
see also D. DOBBS, supra note 11, § 9.2; W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 110. Courts sometimes
use a different phrasing: the difference between the fair value that the victim received and
the fair value of what the victim would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972); Glick v. Campagna, 613
F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1979); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1024-25 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 911 (1977). The alternatives theoretically could produce different recoveries but courts
have not placed any significance on the difference in wording. The alternative phrasing
probably reflects the court's intention to limit plaintiffs' damages to the harm that is proxi-
mately related to the fraud. The difference can be illustrated with an example from Dobbs.
Plaintiff paid $25,000 for a house that defendant represented to be termite free. The plain-
tiff made a bad bargain because even termite free the house was worth only $22,000. Be-
cause the house had termites, its actual value was only $19,000. If the measure of damages is
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from the common-law tort action of deceit, reflects the tort goals of
compensating the injured party for harm and returning plaintiff to
the position he occupied prior to the fraud.2 3 Consistent with cau-
sation limits on a tort recovery, the out of pocket recovery mea-
sures the actual value on the day of the transaction and excludes
any loss that is due to a subsequent decline in the market unre-
lated to the misrepresentation. 24 This tort approach reflects what
courts perceive to be the reality of the securities market-
place-that any investor must assume a risk of fluctuation in stock
value. 5 The out of pocket rule prevents a plaintiff from shifting to
the difference between what the plaintiff received ($19,000) and what he paid ($25,000),
plaintiff can collect $6000. If the measure is the difference between what he received
($19,000) and what he would have obtained had the representation been true ($22,000),
plaintiff is made "whole" for the fraud but is still stuck with the bad bargain. D. DOBBS,
supra note 11, § 9.2, at 596.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(1)(a) and comment 2 (1977). Commenta-
tors have called the out of pocket measure a restitutionary remedy because the remedy
seeks to restore plaintiff to the position plaintiff occupied before the fraud. See, e.g., D.
DOBBS, supra note 11, § 9.2. While this terminology is correct in describing the result, see id.
§ 4.1, restitution is a misnomer if used to suggest that the theoretical basis for a remedy is
the law of restitution or unjust enrichment. See supra note 12. The restitutionary action of
returning plaintiff to the status quo ante is found in both the law of tort and unjust enrich-
ment but is based on different, sometimes conflicting purposes. Restoring the plaintiff to his
prefraud position often quantifies the compensation for the injury as determined under tort
principles. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 547(1)(a) and comment 3 (1977). The law
of unjust enrichment also tends to restore plaintiff to his former position, requiring a de-
fendant to return any benefit obtained by fraud. This restoration to the plaintiff, however,
does not exhaust the basis for defendant's obligation under unjust enrichment. A court ap-
plying unjust enrichment principles may require the defendant to turn over additional bene-
fit that he acquired by reason of infringement of another's interest, even if the plaintiff's
recovery thereby exceeds his injury flowing from the violation. See infra part IV. Thus,
although an out of pocket recovery shares the restitutionary result of restoring the status
quo ante, courts should recognize that the remedy is based on tort principles; such recovery
may parallel, but does not necessarily exhaust any recovery based on unjust enrichment/
restitution.
24. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 190 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Our goal in
formulating a damage instruction must be to compensate appellees precisely for the damage
directly resulting from appellant's wrongful acts."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Hud-
dleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981) ("If the investment deci-
sion is induced by misstatements or omissions that are material and that were relied on by
the claimant, but are not the proximate reason for his pecuniary loss, recovery under the
Rule is not permitted."), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
25. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d at 555 (rescissional measure un-
fair if it compensates an investor for nonspecific risks that he assumes by entering the mar-
ket); see generally Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REv. 371, 375-76 (1974) (Stocks that have a fluctuating value
are influenced as much by general economic market factors as by factors specific to individ-
ual issues. Any rescissionary measure necessarily is speculative and unjust if it compensates
an investor for the nonspecific risk that he must assume any time he enters the market.).
Conversely, a post-fraud market change in plaintiff's favor that reduces his cash loss
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the defendant this usual market risk.
The usual rule 10b-5 out of pocket award does not include any
recovery for what the plaintiff may have gained if the defendant
had performed as promised, an objective usually associated with
the law of contract. A majority of states, however, have adopted
such a "benefit of the bargain" test as the measure of damages for
a tort remedy based on deceit.2" This merging of tort and contract
theory results from the nature of a cause of action based on mis-
representation and deceit.
Deceit is an economic tort, resembling contract principles
more than tort principles in the interests it seeks to protect.2 7 Also,
deceit and the traditional common-law warranty action share a
common historical ancestry with the common-law writ of trespass
on the case.28 Many courts, because of this factual and historical
similarity, believe that recovery under the two claims should be
similar. In particular, courts have expressed concern that a defend-
ant who has committed fraud should not be treated better than a
defendant who has only breached a contract.29 A defendant who
breaches a contract, even in good faith, must make good the
promises in the contract and give the plaintiff the benefit of the
plaintiff's expectancy. If defendants who engage in fraudulent con-
duct must do no more than simply return to the plaintiff the origi-
nal consideration, there will be less deterrence of fraudulent activ-
ity than of innocent contract breaches.3
does not affect a plaintiff's ability to recovery under an out of pocket approach for the full
decline due to the fraud. See Cant v. A. G. Becker & Co., 379 F. Supp. 972 (N.D. Ill. 1974);
Voege v. Ackerman, 364 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
26. See Southern Ice Co. v. Morris, 219 F. 551 (5th Cir. 1915) (construing Georgia
law); Tillis v. Smith Sons Lumber Co., 188 Ala. 122, 65 So. 1015 (1914); Waddell v. White,
56 Ariz. 420, 109 P.2d 843 (1940); Otis & Co. v. Grimes, 97 Colo. 219, 48 P.2d 788 (1935);
Ford v. Dubiskie & Co., 105 Conn. 572, 136 A. 560 (1927); Nye Odorless Incinerator Corp. v.
Fleton, 35 Del. 236, 162 A. 504 (1931); Strickland v. Muir, 198 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967); Chesrown v. Black, 155 Ill. App. 422 (Il. Ct. App. 1910); Sriver v. Maley, 128 Ind.
App. 619, 151 N.E.2d 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 1958); Chellis v. Cole, 116 Me. 283, 101 A. 444
(1917); Roche v. Gryzmish, 277 Mass. 575, 179 N.E. 215 (1931); Whiting v. Price, 172 Mass.
240, 51 N.E. 1084 (1898); Chapman v. Bible, 171 Mich. 663, 137 N.W. 533 (1912); Jeck v.
O'Meara, 343 Mo. 559, 122 S.W.2d 897 (1938); Gunderson v. Havana-Clyde Mining Co., 22
N.D. 329, 133 N.W. 554 (1911); Beare v. Wright, 14 N.D. 26, 103 N.W. 632 (1905).
27. See D. DoBs, supra note 11, § 9.1; see also W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 105.
28. See D. DOBBS, supra note 11, § 9.1. W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 105.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197 (D.N.J.
1955); Stout v. Martin, 87 W. Va. 1, 6, 104 S.E. 157, 159 (1920); C. McCoRMICK, DAMAGES §
121 (1935) (a willful fraud should cost as much as a broken promise).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Ben Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197 (D.N.J.
1955); Morse v. Hutchins, 102 Mass. 439 (1869); Stout v. Martin, 87 W. Va. 1, 104 S.E. 157
(1920).
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Federal courts in rule 10b-5 cases do no follow these common-
law precedents except in unusual circumstances.31 The rejection of
the expectation measure is based on a mixture of statutory inter-
pretation, policy considerations, and history. First, courts have in-
terpreted section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Act)3 2 as limiting the available measures of recovery under section
10(b) and rule 10b-5.38 After stating that the rights and remedies
under the 1934 Act are in addition to all rights and remedies then
existing at law or in equity, section 28 adds that no person can
"recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions,
a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the
act complained of."34 Many courts read this "actual damages"
phrasing to exclude the expected fruits of unrealized expectation, 5
even though respectable contrary authority holds that Congress in-
tended the section only to prevent double recovery on the same
facts in two separate actions in federal and state court or to ex-
clude punitive damages.36
Second, the federal courts' rejection of the benefit of the bar-
gain measure may also reflect the lingering effects of the pre-Erie
3 7
federal common-law rule of damages, which used the out of pocket
measure. Several modern federal securities decisions 8 have cited
the Supreme Court's 1889 decision in Smith v. Bolles to exclude
the use of the benefit of the bargain measure of recovery in rule
10b-5 cases.3 9 In Smith the Court refused to allow a defrauded
31. See, e.g., Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman,
498 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1974); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971); Estate
Counseling Service, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th
Cir. 1962).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1976).
33. See, e.g., Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1974); Levine v. Seilon,
Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971); Estate Planning Service, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
35. See, e.g., Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1974); Levine v. Seilon,
Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971); Estate Counseling Service, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962).
36. See Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1981); John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman,
446 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1971); see also 3 L. Loss, SacuRrrIs REGULATION 1624 (2d ed. 1961 &
1969 Supp.).
37. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
38. See Estate Counseling Service, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962) (quoting Smith v. Bolles, 132 U.S. 125 (1889)); see also Jani-
gan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.) (quoting Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116, 125
(1900)), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
39. 132 U.S. 125 (1889).
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purchaser of stock to recover the "expected fruits of an unrealized
expectation.
40
Last, even if not bowing to the precedent of Smith, modern
courts may continue to share the Smith Court's policy concerns.
Securities by nature have a fluctuating and more uncertain value
than other kinds of property subject to fraudulent transactions.
Thus, measuring the value of the securities' expected worth at
completion of the unfulfilled contract may be more difficult than
determining the value of tangible property and therefore too spec-
ulative to be the basis for damages. The Second Circuit recently
recognized these policy concerns but allowed the use of a benefit of
the bargain measure in the limited situation of a tender offer. The
court felt that it could establish with reasonable certainty the ex-
pectancy damages in the transaction, thus distinguishing the case
from the Smith v. Bolles preoccupation with speculative dam-
ages.4 ' The dispute between the contract and tort measures, how-
ever, may not be particularly important because consequential
damages are available for both measures42, these damages, when
added to the out of pocket or benefit of the bargain amounts, nar-
row, if not eliminate, any difference between the total recovery
under either measure.
B. Consequential Damages
The out of pocket measure does not exhaust the possible dam-
ages that measure plaintiff's harm caused by a misrepresentation.
The plaintiff may have incurred expenses, such as the cost of in-
vestigating the contemplated deal, or subsequent expenditures that
the fraudulent transaction forced the plaintiff to make. The plain-
tiff may recover consequential damages for these costs when they
are the proximate result of the misrepresentation.4 3 A plaintiff
seeking consequential damages for fraud either at common law or
40. Id. at 130.
41. Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 1981) (speculative nature of benefit of
bargain in Smith v. Bolles underlay rejection of that measure of damage in contrast to in-
stant case where the amount that actually was to be received could be determined with
certainty). Courts have applied the benefit of the bargain rule in a variety of situations. See,
e.g., John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1971); see also 5C A. JAcoBs,
supra note 3, at 1155.
42. See D. DOBBS, supra note 11, at § 9.3.
43. See Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1974) (consequential dam-
age incurred by plaintiff while trying to avoid insolvency of company purchased from de-
fendant); Bowman & Bourdon, Inc. v. Rohr, 296 F. Supp. 847, 852 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 417 F.2d
780 (1969).
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under federal securities legislation must establish the causal nexus
with substantial certainty.""
Courts in some situations include within consequential dam-
ages a loss resulting from a general decline in the market following
the fraudulent transaction if the plaintiffs can demonstrate that
their decision to enter the securities market at all was the "natural,
proximate, and foreseeable consequence of defendants' fraud. '4 5
C. The Modified Out of Pocket Measure-A Tort/Restitution
Hybrid
The out of pocket measure requires a court to fix the value of
securities at the time of the transaction. Determining the value
that a fluctuating intangible had at a prior point in time can be
44. Foster v. Financial Technology, Inc., 517 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1975); Zeller v. Bogue
Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); Maryville Acad-
emy v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 530 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (no requisite causal connec-
tion); see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 549(2) (1977).
45. Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 951 (1978); see also Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
The court in Garnatz held that plaintiff's "express disdain" for speculation would have pre-
cluded his participation in a bond margin account program in the absence of the defend-
ant's misrepresentations about the safety of the program. Garnatz, 559 F.2d at 1360. The
court recognized in a footnote that consequential damages provided one theoretical base for
its result, but mentioned rescissionary damages and out of pocket damages with value deter-
mined at a post-transaction date as other possible theories and declined to "adopt any one
perspective." Id. at 1361 n.1. Similarly, the court in Chasins rejected the defendant's at-
tempt to limit damages to the out of pocket measure, ruling instead that plaintiff's recovery
of the entire difference between the purchase price and subsequent resale price was "justi-
fied where . . . the evil is not the price at which [plaintiff] bought but the fact of being
induced to buy and invest for some future growth in these stocks without disclosure of [de-
fendant's] interest. . . ." Chasins, 438 F.2d at 1173.
While some commentators explain both Garnatz and Chasins in terms of consequential
damages principles, see D. DOBBS, supra note 11, at § 9.3, others use "rescissory measure of
damages" or "gross economic harm" to define the recovery, illustrating the overlap of theo-
ries that often characterizes descriptions of damages in rule 10b-5 cases. Compare Cobine,
supra note 4, at 673 (a special form of rescissory damages) with A. JACOBS, supra note 3, at
1150 n.15 (Chasins as a mirror image to cover). See Recent Development, supra note 8, at
805 n.55 (in practice the distinction between Chasins and rescission is "more theoretical
than real"). Some commentators have criticized the Chasins decision for disregarding causa-
tion principles. See Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages in Security Cases and the
Effect of Damage on Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 277, 288 (1977); Note, Rule 10b-5 Dam-
ages: The Runaway Development of a Common Law Remedy, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 76, 85 n.83
(1975); Comment, supra note 25, at 374 (criticizes unworkability of exploring the subjective
determination of the plaintiff investors, particularly in a class action setting). This criticism
has some merit if the Chasins recovery is based on tort principles, but does not apply neces-
sarily to recovery based on unjust enrichment where recovery can exceed the plaintiff's loss
if necessary to prevent a defendant from benefiting as a result of fraudulent conduct. The
legal causation limits on unjust enrichment, which differ from such limits on tort recovery,
are discussed infra text accompanying notes 140-49.
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more difficult than ascertaining the value of a house or a boat."
The problem is particularly acute when the transaction concerns a
closely held corporation whose shares have no ready market or
when the fraud is so widespread that the market price of a widely
traded stock does not reflect its actual value at the time of the
transaction. In these situations, courts have modified the out of
pocket recovery by measuring the value of the intangible securities
at a more easily ascertainable date after the fraudulent transac-
tion. Courts have used either the date of public discovery of the
fraud47 or the date that the plaintiff discovered or should have dis-
covered the fraud.48
The difference between the transaction price and the fair
value at some later time does not necessarily equal the amount of
the harm caused by the misrepresentation. The price on the subse-
quent date may be influenced by many things separate from the
discovery of the fraud, such as a general decline in the market.
Recovery based on the subsequent dates thus may allow plaintiffs
to recovery for harm not related to the fraud.49 One federal district
court criticized the use of the modified out of pocket measure
because
it completely disregards the many other factors which influence price fluctua-
tion over time of stocks in general or of a particular stock. It therefore has
the potential of creating a windfall recovery to a plaintiff in the nature of
indemnification against the risks of the vicissitudes of the market, and at the
same time saddling defendants with payments far out of proportion to the
damage caused by their fraud.50
The cases that allow the use of the subsequent date provide a
variety of reasons-and sometimes no reason-for transferring the
risk of the subsequent market change to the defendant. The court
in some cases simply may accept the subsequent date as good evi-
dence of what the stock was worth at the earlier time. For exam-
46. See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 229-30
(1933).
47. See Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
48. See Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 43-44 (10th Cir. 1971); Esplin v. Hir-
schi, 402 F.2d 94, 104-05 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969).
49. See, e.g., Crane, An Analysis of Causation Under Rule 10b-5, 9 SEc. REG. L.J. 99,
132 (1981); Note, Federal Regulation of Securities: Some Problems of Civil Liability, 48
HARV. L. REv. 107, 116 (1934) (urges causation approach to § 12 of 1933 Act to eliminate
plaintiff's opportunity for speculation).
50. Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), af'd, 556 F.2d 554 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977); see also Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d
175, 190 (3d Cir. 1981).
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ple, one court seeking to determine the value of the stock of a
closely held corporation used a sale two weeks after the fraudulent
transaction as the best evidence of the value of the stock given the
absence of a ready market. 1
Apart from the "best evidence" cases, courts deal with the
causal connection between the misrepresentation and the subse-
quent change in price in three different ways. First, some decisions
provide specific causation findings to support the use of a date
subsequent to the transaction. In these cases the jury decided that
the plaintiff/seller would have held the stock and could have ob-
tained the subsequent rise in price in the absence of the misrepre-
sentation. Thus, even though plaintiff recovered for subsequent
changes in the niarket, that recovery measured the harm that was
causally related to defendant's rule 10b-5 violation.52 Second, some
courts use causation principles to explain why the plaintiff cannot
use a date beyond a reasonable time after the discovery of the
fraud. In these cases the plaintiff's opportunity to reinvest or
"cover" after the discovery of the fraud triggers a second invest-
ment decision by the injured party that breaks the causal connec-
tion to further damages from any subsequent change in the mar-
ket. When this situation occurs, the causal basis for excluding any
loss after the second investment decision is obvious-plaintiff's de-
cision is said to have been a sufficient intervening cause. Less obvi-
ous is the basis for the court's assumption that the entire price
decline between the dates of the fraud and the intervening cause is
attributable to the fraud. 4 While courts may be assuming what the
51. See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The plaintiff complained
that the defendant induced him to sell the shares for too low a price. The court believed
that the subsequent price could not be significantly in excess of the true value because the
corporation sold to friends and relatives of the insiders. The court, however, did not recog-
nize that the price might have been too low because the corporation went public eight
months later at a much higher price. See also Elkind v. Liggett & Meyers, 472 F. Supp. 123
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 653 F.2d 156 (2nd Cir. 1980); Sarlie v. E.L.
Bruce Co., 265 F. Supp. 371, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (the court could support the use of a later
date because the defendant's noncompliance with discovery prevented the plaintiff from
accurately determining the results of the fraud).
52. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1024-25 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977); Myzel v. Field 386 F.2d 718, 744-45 n.23 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
53. See Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 651 F.2d 615 (9th
Cir. 1981); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir. 1971) (recovery
was "the amount it would have taken [plaintiff] to invest in the TGS market within a rea-
sonable period of time after he became informed of the [corrective press] release"), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
54. The court in Arrington approved a measure of damages to compensate the plain-
tiffs for the difference between their actual financial position on the day they discovered the
1984]
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jury found in the previous cases-that a defrauded seller would
have kept the stock but for the fraud and would have sold at the
highest price after the discovery of the fraud55 -neither the com-
mentary nor the cases articulate a basis for this proposition.
Last, some courts use a subsequent date and make no refer-
ence to a causal link between the violation and the value on the
subsequent date used to measure damages .5  The courts state only
that the disclosure date is the first date that the market value re-
flects the true value unaffected by the fraud.57 These courts do not
attempt to justify their implicit holding that the entire decline in
price until the day of discovery is caused by the fraud. One of
these cases, however, suggests an alternative rationale with over-
tones of restitution that does not require the same causal connec-
tion. In Esplin v. Hirschi the court reasoned that the discovery
date was the first date that a plaintiff was in a position to seek
redress either through rescission of the contract or an action for
fraud and had to sell their stock at a loss, and the position they would have been in on that
day if no fraud had occurred. The court noted that the loss arose because the defendant
broker did not disclose the multiplier effect of margin accounts in a declining market and
implied that the subsequent declines that occurred before the day of discovery were the
consequential result of violation. Arrington, 651 F.2d at 621; see also Nye v. Blyth, East-
man, Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1978); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35
(10th Cir. 1971). In Mitchell, only four days elapsed between the misleading press release
and the corrective announcement that triggered the "cover" obligation. See Mitchell, 446
F.2d at 96. The court may have assumed that the new mineral discovery and not changes in
the market caused the entire change in price during that short period. Some writers have
described the result in Mitchell as an essentially rescissory remedy with a reinvestment
obligation. See Comment, supra note 25, at 379; see also SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47
(1st Cir. 1983); Elkind v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 653 F.2d 156, 168 n.25 (2d Cir. 1980)
(describing Mitchell as modified rescissory). In Mitchell, however, no contract on which the
parties could base rescission existed and defendant received no benefit that would justify a
recovery based on unjust enrichment. "Rescissory" may describe the Mitchell result, but the
term does not explain adequately the rationale, which has no substantive connection to re-
scission. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text. The result, which the court de-
scribed as one patterned for the particular case, appears to be based on tort. See Mitchell,
446 F.2d at 105.
Section 927 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts suggests another possible rationale in
its use of damages measured by the highest intermediate value after the fraud. The com-
ment accompanying § 927 states that the highest intermediate value rule is needed to pre-
vent the defendant from realizing speculative possibilities on a rise in the market without
compensation to the plaintiff who is deprived of those possibilities. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
oF TORTS § 927 comment e (1977). The deterrent purpose may replace a specific focus on
actual gain realized or on a causal connection between the violation and plaintiffs loss.
55. See Recent Development, supra note 8, at 803-04.
56. See Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1054 (1976); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 928 (1969).
57. See Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968).
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damages; until the date he discovers the fraud, plaintiff has the
right to rely on defendant's misrepresentations, placing on the de-
fendant the risk of downward fluctuation during that period.58 A
similar logic finds that the seller's obligation to accept the burden
of any loss of value between the date of sale and the disclosure
date is rooted in the contract of sale,59 obligating the seller to take
back the risks he would have borne but for the wrongful sale. 0 The
latter argument, however, is based on the existence of a contract
that gives an innocent party the right to disaffirm the transaction
and require defendant to return any benefit received. The cases
using the modified out of pocket remedy do not always concern a
direct transaction between plaintiff and defendant that would es-
tablish the contract normally required for the rescission. Courts in
these cases tend to combine the independent theoretical justifica-
tions of tort and unjust enrichment without developing the neces-
sary ties to either.
IV. REMEDIES BASED ON UNJUST ENRICHMENT
A. Rescission as an Alternative to Out of Pocket Damages
While the out of pocket measure is the usual standard for re-
covery in a rule 10b-5 action, most courts recognize that a plaintiff
instead may choose rescission or a money judgment that is the
financial equivalent of rescission.6" The alternative reflects the
58. See id. at 104. The court thus partially equates recovery under tort damages with
recovery under rescission even though the plaintiff did not seek rescission. The Federal Se-
curities Code reflects the Esplin approach. See supra note 8.
Esplin, however, also has elements that suggest a traditional tort causation basis for its
rationale. The court stated that the rule is applicable in situations where the purchaser
acquires the securities for investment purposes and intends to retain them for a reasonable
time. This emphasis appears to be based on the famous New York case of Hotaling v. A. B.
Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 84, 159 N.E. 870 (1928), in which the New York Court of Appeals
moved away from the strict out of pocket rule of Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y. 546, 124 N.E. 144
(1919), and held that when the defendant knew that the plaintiff purchased the bonds for
investment and when the misrepresentations went to the financial security of the bonds, the
misrepresentations proximately caused the plaintiff's losses from a decline in the market.
59. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th Cir. 1976)
(Sneed, J., concurring).
60. See id.; see also Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Pigford, 166 So. 749 (Miss. 1936) (Until
plaintiff discovered the fraud he had a right to rely on defendant's misrepresentation that
certain surety companies had secured the bonds. The court imposed on defendant all the
risks of downside fluctuation in the market value until that time.), cert. denied, 299 U.S.
564 (1936).
61. See, e.g., Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978). Some
courts state that rescission and restitution is the usual remedy in a rule 10b-5 case. See
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traditional choice of a nonbreaching party to a contract: either dis-
affirm a breached contract and require the defendant to return any
benefit obtained through the contract or affirm the contract and
sue for damages.62 Courts provided a similar rescission remedy to
the victim of a tortious misrepresentation. A party injured by com-
mon-law fraud sought the restitutionary relief by filing a "bill for
rescission and restitution," s a term that remains in use today. Re-
scission and restitution in this context means simply that the de-
fendant's tort or contract breach entitles the plaintiff to cease per-
formance under the contract if a contract exists and seek
restitutionary relief as an alternative to contract or tort damages.
The restitution remedy then requires the defendant to restore the
property that he obtained by fraud. Rescission and restitution thus
implements the predominate goal of the law of restitution: to pre-
vent unjust enrichment of a person who receives a benefit by the
infringement of another person's interest or by another's loss."6
John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Nelson v.
Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970, appealed, 687 F.2d
278 (9th Cir. 1982) (the recent trend is to look to defendant's profits rather than to plain-
tiff's loss in measuring damage); Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186 (6th Cir.
1974), appealed, 625 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1980). A more accurate statement is that, although
rescission and restitution is a remedy, other remedies are available. At the other extreme,
some courts have suggested that the plaintiff cannot obtain rescission if he can receive dam-
ages; this clearly is not an accurate statement of the law. See Gilbert v. Meyer, 362 F. Supp.
168 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); 1 G. PALMER, supra note 13, at § 3.12.
62. See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 13, at §§ 3.1, 3.3. One judge has suggested that the
defendant is under an obligation imposed by contract "to accept the return of the risk he
wrongfully shifted ... ." Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343 (9th
Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring). See Marr v. Tumulty, 256 N.Y. 15, 175 N.E. 356 (1931)
(Once fraud is shown, plaintiff can force defendant to take back what he transferred; the
right is not dependent on plaintiff returning securities whose market value equaled the mar-
ket value at the time of the transaction). While the obligation that justifies transferring the
market risk may spring from the contract, it does not reflect the expectancy goal of contract
remedies. Instead, plaintiff's historical right to choose the rescission and restitution remedy
reflects the principles of unjust enrichment. See J. POMEROY, EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE § 873
(5th ed. 1941). But see Shulman, supra note 46, at 244 (the difference at common law be-
tween buyer's action for rescission and damages is historical, not based on logic or
principle).
63. See 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 10, at § 1102. Both Corbin and Palmer criticize as
unhelpful the use of the term rescission. Courts of equity usually granted the rescission and
restitution remedy since law courts were slower to recognize fraud in the inducement. See 1
G. PALMER, supra note 13, at §§ 3.1-3.7. Law courts sometimes gave similar restitution-
based recovery in quasi-contract. Id.
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983); see also
J. POMEROY, supra note 62, at § 873. "[T]he jurisdiction of chancery. . . embraced all those
cases where a party, although still keeping within the limits of the strict law. . . had com-
mitted some unconscientious act or breach of good faith, and had thereby obtained an un-
due advantage over another, which advantage,. . . equity would not suffer him retain. Id.;
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The result is the same as that sought in tort law-returning plain-
tiff as nearly as possible to his position prior to the tort-but the
similarity between the ultimate objectives of tort and unjust en-
richment should not obscure the fundamental difference in ap-
proach between the two sources of obligations. Unjust enrichment
looks to the defendant's gain as the basis of the obligation and the
measure of recovery, while tort law looks to plaintiff's injury and
awards damages based on the harm to the plaintiff. The difference
is illustrated by those cases in which the court permitted rescission
and restitution even absent a showing that defendant's misrepre-
sentation caused the plaintiff's pecuniary harm-a showing re-
quired for tort damages. 6 5 Similarly, defendant's intent to defraud
is not a prerequisite to recovery based on rescission, even though it
is required for a recovery in deceit. Courts can require a defendant
who made an innocent misrepresentation to return the considera-
tion received in the transaction."6
When courts recognized the existence of private causes of ac-
tion under rule 10b-5, most courts also acknowledged that a rule
10b-5 plaintiff could seek rescission instead of pursuing an action
for damages.8 7 This result is consistent with the common-law fraud
precedent and also with the Supreme Court's general approach to
securities law remedies that "federaf courts may use any available
see generally D. DOBBS, supra note 11, § 9.3 (rescission is contrasted to damages; emphasis
is on the inequity of allowing a party to keep benefits caused by his own misstatement); G.
PALMER, supra note 13, § 3.1 230 (rescission of a contract for fraud in inducement is part of
the law of restitution, which generally is concerned with giving relief for unjust enrichment).
Rescission was granted primarily by courts of equity, but occasionally by courts of law. With
the merger of law and equity, this distinction today primarily concerns a defendant's right
to a jury trial. Courts have struggled with whether juries can award rescissory damages. See
Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 n.17 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 343 F. Supp. 245, 251 (D. Md. 1972), rev'd, 488 F.2d 912
(4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
65. See Stillwell v. Rankin, 55 Mont. 130, 134, 174 P. 186, 187 (1918); accord Barrons
v. Myers, 109 N.W. 862 (Mich. 1906); see also Shulman, supra note 46, at 250.
66. See Seneca Wire & Mfg. Co. v. A. B. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 1, 159 N.E. 700 (1928).
Recovery for innocent misrepresentation is comparable to recovery for mutual mistake in
the formation of a contract. "If rescission . . ., followed by restitution of each party, is justi-
fied in simple cases of mutual mistake, it is equally justified in cases where there is a mutual
mistake and one of the parties innocently verbalizes that mistake." D. DOBBS, supra note 11,
§ 9.2, at 609; see also 1 G. PALMER, supra note 13, at § 3.1.
67. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 816 (1976); Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1965); Errion v.
Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250, 262




remedy to make good the wrong done. '"68 In addition, section 29 of
the 1934 Act69 provides specific statutory authorization for rescis-
sion of any contract made in violation of the Act.70 Alternatively,
some courts interpreted the "actual damages" provision of section
28 of the 1934 Act to allow defrauded parties a choice of rescission
or profits on resale instead of out of pocket damages. 1
When restitution of specific property is not possible, such as
when the defendant has disposed of or changed the form of what
he received from the plaintiff, courts, applying common-law princi-
ples, allow a money judgment that is the financial equivalent of
rescission.7 1 One of the earliest rule 10b-5 cases, Speed v. Tran-
samerica Corp.,73 reflects such a rescissory measure of damages
based on unjust enrichment principles. In Speed, defendant insid-
ers induced plaintiffs to sell their stock at a price that did not re-
flect unrealized appreciation of the company's main asset, which
the insiders intended to liquidate. The court refused to use the de-
fendant's proposed out of pocket measure and instead chose a re-
scissory remedy to prevent defendants from keeping the benefits
obtained by fraud.74 Rescissory recovery in these circumstances re-
lieves the plaintiff of the obligation to prove damages with the par-
ticularity mandated in a tort action seeking damages. For example,
in Holdsworth v. Strong7 5 the court permitted a rescissory measure
of recovery upon the plaintiff's showing merely that the defendant
received a benefit by inducing plaintiff to relinquish participation
68. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 684 (1946)).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1982). Section 29 provides that
[e]very contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of any rule (in-
cluding any contract for listing a security on an exchange) heretofore or hereafter
made, the performance of which involves the violation of, or the continuance of any
relationship or practice in violation of, any provision of this chapter or any rule or
regulation thereunder, shall be void ....
70. Courts have interpreted § 29 to mean that these contracts are voidable at the op-
tion of the innocent party. See, e.g., Eastside Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391
F.2d 357 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 913 (1968).
71. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp. 740, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
72. See, e.g., Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va. 310, 314, 92 S.E. 454, 455 (1916) (defendant
ordered to pay plaintiff the value of any shares that defendant could not restore).
73. 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
74. Id. at 186. The district court refused to adopt defendant's out of pocket measure
of damages stating that the perpetrator of fraud must disgorge the gains made at the ex-
pense of injured shareholders. See also A. JACOBS, supra note 3, at 11-72 (the basis for
rescissory damages is the unjust enrichment that plaintiff bestowed on defendant).
75. 545 F.2d 687, 697 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
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in a profitable enterprise.
When a plaintiff chooses the rescission and restitution remedy,
he tenders to the defendant that which he received and the de-
fendant returns the consideration received from the plaintiff. Re-
scission thus has an obvious advantage over out of pocket recovery
because it permits a plaintiff to shift the risk of a declining market
to the defendant. Consider the following hypothetical: Defendant
misrepresents that certain stock possesses qualities that make it
worth $10 more per share than it would be worth without those
qualities and plaintiff purchases the stock, relying on the misrepre-
sentation. After discovering the fraud, plaintiff will want to recover
for the amount attributable to the fraud and can do so under an
out of pocket measure. If, however, plaintiff discovers the fraud
after world events have driven down the price of all stocks, the
plaintiff can choose to unwind the sale, return the depreciated
stock, and receive back undepreciated cash, recovering not only the
loss caused by the misrepresentation, but also the loss caused by
the decline in the market.76 Judges and writers recognize that liti-
gants will choose between rescission or damages based on whether
the market has risen or fallen since the transaction.
77
The concern that rescission will redistribute market risks that
have nothing to do with the fraud has influenced courts in securi-
ties cases to adopt the restrictions on rescission developed by eq-
uity courts, particularly the requirement that plaintiffs file suits
for rescission promptly after notice of the fraud.78 Courts show
particular concern that plaintiffs not be permitted to delay a
choice of the rescission remedy while speculating on the fluctuating
76. See, e.g., Doyle v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 59 P.2d 1171 (Mont. 1936); Beare v.
Wright, 14 N.D. 26, 33, 103 N.W. 632, 634 (1905) ("he could have escaped all the conse-
quences of a bad speculation [not only those due to fraud] by withdrawing from it by rescis-
sion"); Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va. 310, 92 S.E. 454 (1916); see generally 1 G. PALMER,
supra note 13, at § 3.8 ("[o]ne of the most striking differences between restitution and the
damage action"). But see Note, supra note 25, at 375-76 (1974) (any rescissory measure of
damages necessarily is speculative and unjust if it compensates an investor for the nonspe-
cific risk that he must assume any time that he enters the market).
77. See, e.g., Estate Counseling Service, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1962) (advantageous for plaintiff to claim rescission if loss
was imminent or to disclaim rescission if profit was apparent; prompt election required); L.
Loss, supra note 3, at 1133; see also A. JAcoBs, supra note 3, at 11-69; 1 G. PALMER, supra
note 13, at § 3.8.
78. See, e.g., Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574 (4th Cir. 1969) (rescission barred
because plaintiff waited 18 months), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Hickman v. Groes-
beck, 389 F. Supp. 769 (D. Utah 1974); Maginess v. Western Sec. Corp., 38 Cal. App. 56, 175
P. 277 (1918); see also 12A C.J.S. Cancellation of Instruments: Rescission § 68 (1980).
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value of the property in question. 9
B. The Windfall Profits Cases-Measuring the Defendant's
Gain
The "windfall profits" cases, in which a defrauded seller of
stock recovers profits made by defendants on a subsequent resale
of the fraudulently acquired property, provide another example of
recovery based on unjust enrichment principles. The First Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1965 decided the best-known windfall profits
case, Janigan v. Taylor.80 The Janigan plaintiffs were a class of
individuals who sold their stock to the corporation's president for
approximately $40,000; less than two years later, the defendant
sold the stock for $700,000. The court approved a recovery of de-
fendant's net profit from the resale."1
Janigan clearly reflects the court's reliance on an unjust en-
richment rationale, rather than on liability measured by plaintiff's
harm. The court acknowledged that out of pocket and consequent-
79. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250, 262-63 (D. Md. 1971)
(plaintiff must not delay filing, particularly if by delaying, he desires to engage in, or actu-
ally does engage in, speculation), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
Courts have applied the Supreme Court's concern over oil wells expressed in Twin-Lick
Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587 (1875), to securities:
Property worth thousands today is worth nothing to-morrow .... The injustice,
therefore, is obvious, of permitting one holding the right to assert an ownership in such
property to voluntarily await the event, and then decide, when the danger which is over
has been at the risk of another, to come in and share the profit.
Id. at 592-93, quoted in Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574-75 (4th Cir. 1969). Courts inter-
pret the securities law as intended to protect innocent investors, not those who seek to
speculate at a defendant's expense. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 741 n.15 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210,
213-14 (9th Cir. 1962).
80. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
81. Id. at 783, 787. The appellate court required the trial court to modify the award to
permit defendant an allowance for a 10% bonus of the company's net pre-tax profits under
a procedure that predated the fraud unless plaintiff could show that there would have been
a change in this compensation. Id. at 787.
The Supreme Court approved Janigan in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972). The Court referred to the unjust enrichment recovery as "damages." Id. at
155. Restitution often leads to a money award, but it is distinct from damages. See 1 G.
PALMER, supra note 13, at § 3.1. Courts frequently blur this distinction. See, e.g., Burgess v.
Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 837 (9th Cir. 1984). Lower courts have extended Janigan to
include defrauded purchasers as well. See, e.g., Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d
795, 801-02 (2d Cir.) (The thrust of the rationale in Janigan and Ute does not preclude
windfall profits to purchasers. The difficulty of showing that the fraudulent seller received
the gain may prevent courts from applying the rationale.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973);
see also Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 1982).
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ial damages rules, which courts usually apply in defrauded buyer
cases, did not cover the expected fruit of unrealized expectations. e
The court, however, recognized that defrauded seller cases are dif-
ferent because "future accretions not foreseeable at the time of the
transfer even on the true facts, and hence speculative, are subject
to another factor, viz., that they accrued to the fraudulent party."83
The other factor to which the court referred is the unjust enrich-
ment of the defendant, which equity requires the wrongdoer to
disgorge.
8 4
Recovery in restitution is based on unjust enrichment, mea-
sured by the benefit received "by reason of an infringement of an-
other person's interest, or of loss suffered by the other. '8 5 Unjust
enrichment does not require that plaintiff prove losses that were
causally related to the violation, 6 but rather looks to defendant's
gain derived from the fraud.8 7 Unjust enrichment also does not re-
quire that defendant's gain equal plaintiff's loss in the transaction;
if the gain is more, the plaintiff may recover that amount.8 Jani-
gan supports the windfall for plaintiffs because "[i]t is more appro-
priate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls
than to let the fraudulent party keep them. 8 ' This preference re-
flects a deterrent element that often accompanies a compensatory
82. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1965).
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 970 (1978).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983); see 1 G.
PALMER, supra note 13, at § 3.8 (necessary that there be some injury but it need not be
measured in money).
86. See 3 & 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1627, 3883 (1961 & Supp. 1969); 1 G.
PALMER, supra note 13, at § 3.8.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 94-101.
88. See, e.g., Federal Sugar Ref. Co. v. United States Equalization Bd., 268 F. 575
(S.D.N.Y. 1920) (defendant wrongfully interfered with plaintiff's contract and took plain-
tiff's place as a supplier to a third party; plaintiff permitted to sue for defendant's profits
awarded even though plaintiff would have lost money had it.been able to carry out the
contract); Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 185 Va. 534, 39 S.E.2d 231 (1946) (no economic
loss to plaintiff but court allowed him to recover defendant's benefit); see also 1 G. PALMER,
supra note 13, at §§ 2.6, 2.10; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1983).
89. Janigan 344 F.2d at 786; see also Rude v. Cambell Square, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1040,
1050 (D.S.D. 1976). Janigan, is very similar to a famous equity case decided 40 years earlier.
Judge Cardozo wrote an opinion for the New York Court of Appeals allowing a defrauded
seller of corporate stock to recover not merely the difference between value and the amount
paid by the defendant, but the price on resale if that was greater than the value. Falk v.
Hoffman, 233 N.Y. 199, 135 N.E. 243 (1922).
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result in recoveries based on unjust enrichment 0 The two-pronged
purpose is consistent with the federal securities laws, which courts
long have recognized as designed to both compensate and deter. 1
While some courts and defendants have termed punitive any re-
covery based on unjust enrichment,9 2 other courts have recognized
appropriately that there is no "harshness in a remedy which takes
from a fraudulent actor what was generated by his conduct."s
Limits to recovery based on unjust enrichment do exist, of
course, but courts determine these limits primarily by the relation-
ship of the defendant's gain to the fraud, not the relationship of
plaintiff's loss to the violation. The Janigan court recognized that
a court would not require a defendant to return any extraordinary
gains attributable to his personal efforts that were unconnected to
the fraud.9 4 The court provided a now-famous illustration of this
exception to the recovery of windfall profits: "If an artist acquired
paints by fraud and used them in producing a valuable portrait we
would not suggest that the defrauded party would be entitled to
the portrait, or to the proceeds of its sale."95 On the particular
facts of Janigan the court found that defendant's efforts did not
fall within this exception. Defendant testified that following the
acquisition of the stock, he acted no differently and worked no
harder than he had before the acquisition. He also stated that the
company's financial recovery'resulted from price rises, increased
efficiency, and an improvement in the business cycle primarily af-
fecting the company's customers.98 The Janigan court appeared to
require some extraordinary effort or talent on the part of the de-
fendant to preclude unjust enrichment recovery.
Subsequent cases confirm the difficulty of coming within the
90. Although both compensatory and deterrent purposes are evident, unjust enrich-
ment recovery does not promote either fully. Full compensation may require more than the
return of the benefit the defendant received by virtue of the harm. See supra note 81. Maxi-
mum deterrence may require that defendant give back more than the amount taken. See
infra note 205 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 1978) ("To allow viola-
tors of the Act to profit by their misconduct would undermine the deterrence that the Act
was intended to effect."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978).
92. See, e.g., Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1979).
93. Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970
(1978); see also Jones, The Recovery of Benefits Gained from a Breach of Contract, 99 L. Q.
REv. 443, 456 (1983) ("Moreover, to be deprived of what you have gained can never be a
penal liability ....").
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Janigan exception. Rochez Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades17 concerned a
corporation with two equal owners who disagreed about how to run
the corporation. The trial court characterized the defendant pur-
chaser (Rhoades) an an aggressive entrepreneur and the plaintiff
seller (Rochez) as a more cautious investor who was not inclined to
take risks. Rhoades purchased Rochez' stock and nine months later
sold the entire company at a substantial profit.98 The court found
that much of the increased resale value neither existed nor could
have existed while Rochez was half-owner, in part because plain-
tiff's caution would have prevented the company from taking ad-
vantage of certain financial opportunities.9  Nevertheless, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals refused to allow any reduction
under the Janigan exception. 100 It would not permit defendant to
retain any value arising from the consolidation of control because
defendant obtained that control by fraud.10'
C. The Tort/Restitution Confusion
For a variety of reasons, courts have been slow to recognize
unjust enrichment as an independent basis of recovery in rule 10b-
5 cases and instead have dealt with securities fraud primarily
under tort concepts. The neglect of the unjust enrichment remedy
is due in part to the historical development of the different sub-
stantive areas of the law-tort principles coalesced well before
those underlying the law of restitution. 102 If the principles based
on plaintiff's harm (tort) and defendant's gain (unjust enrichment)
led to the same result in a case, courts not surprisingly would think
97. 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973).
98. Id. at 412.
99. Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 353 F. Supp. 795, 804 (W.D. Pa. 1973), vacated, 491 F.2d
402 (3d Cir. 1973).
100. Rochez Bros., 491 F.2d at 412.
101. Id. The court's failure to invoke the Janigan exception in these circumstances led
one writer to conclude that Rochez had "destroyed whatever vitality the Janigan limitation
possessed." See Note, supra note 45, at 94. The district court in Rude v. Campell Square,
Inc. similarly focused its interpretation of the Janigan rule and its exception on the fruits of
defendant's fraud. 411 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.D. 1976). In Rude the value of a corporation had
increased dramatically after the corporation's president fraudulently purchased the 51% in-
terest held by the original cofounder's widow. The corporation's increased wealth reflected
the effect of natural commercial growth on the real estate that was the corporation's major
asset and a "windfall" in commercial development around that property. The court refused
to apply the Janigan exception and gave plaintiff the benefits of the windfall rather than let
the fraudulent party keep them. Id. at 1050.
102. "The common elements of the claims we now call restitutionary were not widely
perceived until well into this century." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF RESTITUMoN, Introduc-
tion at 1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983).
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(and write) of recovery in tort law terms. Courts in rule 10b-5 cases
have exacerbated this tendency to apply tort concepts because tort
theory was so important in the creation of the implied private
cause of action itself.103 Courts also have used tort law analogies in
numerous rule 10b-5 cases to define the elements of the implied
cause of action.10 Not surprisingly, courts faced for the first time
with the question of remedy in rule 10b-5 cases found that tort law
provided an attractive route through familiar territory. 0 5 Unfortu-
nately, this tort law slant has had several limiting effects on the
development of remedies for rule 10b-5 violations. Some early
cases and commentary excluded unjust enrichment as a basis of
obligation by construing section 28 of the 1934 Act' to prevent
any recovery based on gains that accrue to the defrauding party. 0 7
While later courts abandoned this explicit exclusion of gain, the
exclusion of unjust enrichment recovery remains implicit in recent
cases and commentary which simply fail to mention unjust enrich-
ment as an alternative to recovery based on tort principles. Courts
and commentators view rule 10b-5 as essentially a tort claim re-
103. See supra note 18.
104. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.) (common-law
requirement that the misstatement be material is present for rule 10b-5 actions), cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 771 (D.
Colo. 1964) (rule 10b-5 plaintiffs must show the tort concept of proximate causation);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1962) (reliance is an indispensable
element of 10b-5 actions), affl'd on other grounds, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
105. See Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1978); Trussell v. United Un-
derwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964). But see Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F. 2d
291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968) (rejecting punitive damages: "We have gone far beyond the limits of
the common law in imposing liability under 10b-5 and thus may not import all other aspects
of common-law fraud without scrutiny."), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). The use of tort
theory to imply a cause of action need not have limited the remedy to tort damages. Tradi-
tionally, courts recognized that a victim of a tort could seek a remedy in restitution instead
of damages, a remedy misleadingly termed "to waive the tort and sue in assumpsit." See 1
G. Palmer, supra note 13, at § 2.1. Rule 10b-5 cases have not employed such terms but
instead focus on the usual tort remedy of damages.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
107. See Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 361 F. Supp. 255, 261 (S.D. Ohio 1973)
(damage includes only actual losses and not the gains that accrue to the defrauding party),
vacated, 498 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1974); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 208 F. Supp. 808, 825 (E.D.
Wis. 1962) (plaintiff may not recover any actual or potential gain that defendant received),
aff'd on other grounds, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); see also Note, Remedies for Private
Parties Under Rule 10b-5, 10 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 337, 343 (1969) ("This disgorge-
ment of profit theory is inappropriate to measure damages in 10b-5 actions."). But see Nel-
son v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978). This
construction cannot be attributed only to a tort bias. It is a plausible interpretation of the
"actual damages" wording of the statute, even though reasonable contrary interpretations
exist. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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quiring a plaintiff to show cause in fact and proximate cause. 108
Although a rule 10b-5 action is essentially a tort claim when the
fraudulent transaction has provided no benefit to defendant,
courts have phrased their holdings so broadly to suggest that tort
principles are a requirement for recovery in any case, which would
include cases in which unjust enrichment is present.109 This tort
orientation to rule 10b-5 leads some courts unnecessarily to impose
tort law legal causation limitations on recoveries that are based on
rescission or windfall profits. Courts limit these two remedies to
prevent plaintiffs from recovering losses that are not proximately
caused by the fraud, and in particular any profits that plaintiffs
could not have acquired for themselves. While such concerns are
appropriate for tort based recovery, they do not apply equally to
recovery based on unjust enrichment. This erroneous view is pre-
sent in both rescission and windfall profits cases; yet, both kinds of
cases can be understood best by looking to the unjust enrichment
of the defendant.
1. Application of Tort Principles to Recoveries Termed
Rescissory
In the normal rescission case, the parties unwind the transac-
tion, with each party returning to the other that which he received
in the transaction. When the defendant returns that which he ob-
tained by fraud he also puts the plaintiff back in the position he
was in before the fraudulent transaction. The result is the same as
that achieved by the out of pocket and consequential damage mea-
sures, so that courts sometimes assume that the same tort princi-
ples support all the remedies. Courts thus appear to use the mea-
108. See, e.g., Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1978); Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 771 (D. Colo. 1964); see also Cobine, supra
note 4, at 654 (because rule 10b-5 is based on statutory tort theory, a 10b-5 plaintiff, like
any tort plaintiff, must show that defendant's conduct was not only the cause in fact of
injuries but also was the proximate cause); Note, Insiders' Liability Under Rule 10b-5 for
the Illegal Purchase of Actively Traded Securities, 78 YALE L.J. 864, 868 (1969) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Insiders Liability] (if liability is based on tort doctrine, the doctrine itself
restricts liability to those losses that defendant actually caused); Note, Civil Liability Under
Section lob and Rule 10b-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 75 YALE
L.J. 658, 677 (1965) (abandonment of causation requirement would do violence to logical
underpinnings of implied civil liability).
109. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981) (recov-
ery not permitted under rule 10b-5 if the misrepresentation is not the proximate reason for
plaintiff's loss), aff'd in part and revd in part, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Beissinger v. Rock-




The rescissory label is attractive to courts because it com-
municates easily the result that the court believes is appropri-
ate-measuring value at a day subsequent to the transaction in the
traditional manner of rescission. This label, however, often inaccu-
rately describes the courts' reasoning for applying the rescissory
measure. Courts rely not on the fact that defendant must return a
benefit received by fraud,' but rather on the perception that the
subsequent change in the market is part of plaintiff's harm caus-
ally related to defendant's violation.
Applying this tort view of rescission, several courts limit plain-
tiff's rescissory award to compensation for injuries proximately re-
lated to defendant's fraud and therefore refuse any recovery that
would put the plaintiff in a better position than he enjoyed before
the fraud." 2 The court in American General Insurance Co. v. Eq-
uitable General Corp."'s applied this type of limitation when a cor-
poration's misrepresentations induced the plaintiff to sell its stock
back to the corporation for $32.50 per share and therefore miss out
on a subsequent acquisition of the entire company for fifty-one
dollars per share. The court awarded the plaintiff what it termed a
rescissory measure of recovery, but limited the award to an amount
based on a forty-four dollars per share value. The court concluded
that, absent the misrepresentation, the plaintiff would have contin-
ued as a shareholder and would have participated in the subse-
quent bidding war, which would have resulted in the corporation's
being sold for only forty-four dollars per share."" The award of
any additional money would give plaintiff a recovery that it would
not have been in a position to acquire absent the fraud and there-
110. See, e.g., Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1215 n.15 (5th Cir. 1982) (court of
appeals used a consequential damages theory to affirm an award that the district court had
termed rescissory), affg 475 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. Tex. 1979), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 287
(1983); see also Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978); note 45 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Huddleston
v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 554 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[rescission's] purpose is to return
the defrauded purchaser to the status quo ante") (citing Green v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1342 (1976) (Sneed, J., concurring)), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
103 S. Ct. 683 (1983); Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978); Cant v. A.G. Becker & Co., 384 F. Supp. 814, 816 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
113. American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Va.
1980).
114. Id. at 758-59, 766.
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fore compensate it for harm not causally related to the violation. 115
Similar tort principles also may explain the broker churning
cases that label their recovery as rescissory. Like true rescission
cases, some broker churning cases measure the value of securities
at a time after the fraudulent transaction. These decisions, how-
ever, reduce the plaintiff's loss by an index that reflects the aver-
age decline in the market during the time of the violations.116
Under tort principles, if the evidence indicated that plaintiff's
portfolio would have declined in value even if the broker had not
fraudulently mismanaged it, then the fraud was not the legal cause
of the loss and plaintiff could not recover.
In contrast, if traditional grounds for rescission were present
in either of the fact situations described in the last two
paragraphs-if the defendant derived a benefit through a fraudu-
lent transaction with the plaintiff-true rescission would require
the defendant to return the entire consideration even if plaintiff
thereby would recovery an amount beyond that causally related to
the loss. 11 7 Thus the plaintiff in American General could recover
based on the fifty-one dollar price and the plaintiff in the broker
churning case could recover the entire decline in price."1 Recovery
based on unjust enrichment may not be appropriate in the cases
just discussed; the defendant may not have received an identifiable
gain or, in churning cases, the plaintiff's loss causally related to the
violation may exceed the benefit (the broker's commission) that
the defendant received in the transaction. In such cases to label
the remedy rescissory, however, only disguises a tort based recov-
ery1 and confuses courts that attempt to apply a true rescissory
measure of relief when grounds for recovery based on unjust en-
115. Id. at 759; see supra notes 24-25.
116. See Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 49 n.22 (2d Cir.) ("The
rescission theory of damages which we essentially utilize here cannot restore a plaintiff to a
better position than he would have been in had the fraud not occurred.") (emphasis in origi-
nal), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). Churning occurs when a dealer induces excessive
transactions in a customer's account that sometimes results in losses to the customer but
commissions to the broker. See Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80 HARv. L. REv. 869
(1967).
117. See supra note 76; infra part IV; see also G. DouTHwArrm, ATTORNEY's GUIDE TO
RESTITUTION 323 (1977).
118. See Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970) (award includes
decline in price); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.) (award includes subsequent prof-
its), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
119. Some commentators see any distinction between out of pocket recovery and re-
scission as involving only "semantics." E.g., Note, supra note 45, at 87. As illustrated in the




2. Tort Limitations on Windfall Profits Recovery
Courts frequently misunderstand the Janigan measure of re-
covery because they insist on viewing the recovery from the plain-
tiff's standpoint, as normally would be appropriate in a tort case.
While courts readily acknowledge that the purpose of restitution is
to prevent unjust enrichment, they often include a second "pur-
pose," that of putting the plaintiff back where he was before the
fraud.120 This second purpose is the goal of tort law and also the
usual result of recovery on the basis of unjust enrichment. Courts,
however, often raise the second purpose to an absolute limitation
that denies the plaintiff any recovery that he could not have ob-
tained absent the fraud.
12
1
For example, a panel of the Second Circuit has limited Jani-
gan to situations "where there are present both elements ...
namely (1) that a wrongdoer might be profiting by his own wrong,
and (2) that, even if there were fraud, the defrauded party might
have been in the position of earning the profits it seeks from the
wrongdoer."'1 22 To make the Janigan decision consistent with this
view, courts and commentators read into Janigan an assumption
that, but for the fraud, the seller would have retained the stock
and obtained the subsequent price increase.1
23
120. Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 589 (3d Cir. 1975); Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, 478 F.2d 1281, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973); Zeller v. Boque Elec. Mfg. Co., 476 F.2d 795,
802 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
121. See, e.g., Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1979); Simon v. New Haven
Board & Carton Co., 516 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1975).
122. Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 516 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1975).
123. See, e.g., Capital Investments, Inc. v. Bank of Sturgeon Bay, 430 F. Supp. 534,
537 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (all rescissory damage decisions reflect the common assumption that
but for the fraud, defrauded seller would have retained securities and obtained the pur-
chaser's profits on resale; courts will not award profits if defendant can show that plaintiff
would not have retained securities), af'd, 577 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1978); Gould v. American
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 362 F. Supp. 771 (D. Del 1973), vacated, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976);
Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases, 65 GEo. L.J. 1093, 1096 n.16 (1977);
Weiskopf, Remedies Under Rule 10b-5, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 733, 737 (1971); Note, supra
note 107, at 344; Comment, SEC v. MacDonald, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 277, 282 n.34 (1983).
In one commentator's opinion, it was reasonably certain that the plaintiff in Janigan
would have refused the initial sale and held on to the stock until the subsequent resale. See
Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation
Law Under Rule 10b-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361, 1377 (1965). Use of this theory as the basis
for the plaintiff's recovery is open to a serious factual causation question in many windfall
profits cases. See Note, Insiders Liability, supra note 108, at 883 (court termed dubious the
assumption that plaintiff in Baumel would have retained stock); Comment, Private Reme-
dies Available Under Rule 10b-5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620, 626 (1966) (basic rescission premise that
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The resulting limitations, however, simply are not consistent
with the law of unjust enrichment or with Janigan itself. Recovery
based on principles of restitution and unjust enrichment provides a
remedy "'by which defendant is made to disgorge ill-gotten gains
or to restore the status quo, or . . . both . . . ,2 Restitution
goes beyond returning the plaintiff to an earlier position if neces-
sary to prevent defendant's unjust enrichment.12 5 The Janigan
court recognized that recovery did not turn on what the plaintiff
would have been in a position to obtain: "It may, as in the case at
bar, be entirely speculative whether, had plaintiffs not sold, the
series of fortunate occurrences would have happened in the same
way, and to their same profit. 1 26 Instead the court gave recovery
because "it is simple equity that a wrongdoer should disgorge his
fraudulent enrichment.
1 27
Several of the federal courts of appeal in the last decade have
recognized the possibility that recovery based on unjust enrich-
ment principles can put the plaintiff in a better position than he
was in before the fraud. In Thomas v. Duralite, s1 the Third Cir-
cuit acknowledged that the
theory of damages which allows windfall profits does not depend solely on the
premise that, but for the fraud, the injured party would have realized these
gains. Additionally, there is the philosophy that if the defendant made profits
through the use of assets which he had fraudulently acquired, he should not
be permitted to keep them." '2
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Zeller v. Bogue Electric Man-
ufacturing Corp.130 noted that a fraudulent seller should be re-
quired "to disgorge any profits he would not otherwise have been
in a position to realize if [the profits] can be traced with sufficient
certainty." ' The court found that the unjust enrichment remedy
plaintiff would have retained stock does not always seem to be warranted).
One commentator has argued that the mere fact that a plaintiff sold should indicate his
willingness to sell at an equitable price, so courts should require plaintiffs to disprove, or at
least allow defendants to try to prove, that the plaintiff would have sold at some higher
price-the fair market perhaps-but short of the resale price. Note, supra note 107, at 344.
124. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec. Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting 5
J. MooRe, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 38.24[2], at 190.6 (1977)).
125. See G. DoUTHwArrz, supra note 117, at 323.
126. Janigan, 344 F.2d at 786 (emphasis supplied).
127. Id.
128. 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975).
129. Id. at 589.
130. 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
131. Id. at 802 n.10. The benefit in question concerned a parent corporation's ob-
taining loans from its subsidiary (on whose behalf plaintiff brought the derivative suit) at
below-market interest rates. Plaintiff also alleged that the loans enabled the defendant to
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did not depend upon the defrauded purchaser's showing that the
defendant received a benefit that the plaintiff otherwise would
have been in a position to obtain.'3 2 In Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc. the Second Circuit acknowledged that it could base recovery
on either recapturing defendant's unjust enrichment or returning
plaintiff to his prefraud position, but found neither appropriate on
the facts in that case.'
Two recent cases illustrate how recovery in a single transac-
tion can vary depending upon whether the court bases the award
on unjust enrichment or on tort concepts of restoring plaintiff to
his position prior to the fraud.' In these two cases the courts al-
avoid having to sell certain assets in a depressed market, thus producing additional benefit
when the assets were sold eventually at more favorable terms. The court suggested that the
interest rate spread should not be considered a benefit obtained from an invasion of subsidi-
ary's interest unless plaintiff could show that a new company with characteristics similar to
the subsidiary could find borrowers at the market rate and had money to lend to them.
Even after plaintiff made this showing the court still conditioned recovery upon a showing
that the parent could have preserved the profit in question only by the below-market loan
from the subsidiary.
132. Id.
133. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). Gamble-Skogmo owned 52% of General Outdoor
Advertising (GOA) and sought shareholder approval for a merger of the two companies. The
proxy solicitation failed to disclose the parent company's plan to sell GOA's nine local ad-
vertising plants for well in excess of the "book" value. Id. at 1284-89. The court affirmed the
parent's obligation to return to the subsidiary's minority shareholders a proportional share
of the appreciation on the plants sold within nine months after the merger because this was
a benefit that the parent had acquired by misrepresentation. Id. at 1290, 1310. The court,
however, did not accept the plaintiffs' argument that the defendants also were obligated to
return the subsequent appreciation in the value of the other unrelated businesses, which the
defendant's misrepresentations did not concern and which the defendant did not sell until
nine years after the merger. Id. at 1305-06. The court found that adequate disclosure would
not have assured that plaintiff minority shareholders would have obtained the appreciated
profit of the businesses sold after nine years. Id. The court concluded that the merger would
have occurred even absent the fraud but only after a change in terms. Plaintiffs would have
received a share of the appreciation of the local advertising plant, but the share would not
include the other assets. The court viewed plaintiffs' request for the remaining assets' high-
est intermediate value between the merger and the day of judgment as based similarly and
likewise rejected that claim as "'too untenable and speculative to support an award of dam-
ages.'" Id. at 1305 (quoting the trial court, 332 F. Supp. at 647). The court recognized that
Janigan contained an independent rationale based on unjust enrichment. 478 F.2d at 1306.
Nonetheless, the court negated the rationale with the conclusory statement that "the nexus
between the misrepresentation and the damage award would be too thin if. . . stretched to
include appreciation [of the value of the shares of the remaining assets]." Id. In a footnote,
the court referred to a "general recognition of the unfairness to defendants of undue prolon-
gation of the period for calculating damages." Id. at 1306 n.27. According to the court both
the requirement for prompt filing of suit and the limitation of highest value to a reasonable
time after the tortious conduct reflect this general concern. Id. The First Circuit's recent
decision in SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983), made a similar point, which is
criticized in the text accompanying supra notes 154-63.
134. Nelson v. Serwold, 687 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978);
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lowed the plaintiffs to recover windfall profits from one defendant
under the unjust enrichment rationale in Janigan. When grounds
for unjust enrichment did not exist against other defendants, how-
ever, the courts found that the plaintiffs could recover only the
amount they would have been in a position to obtain if the fraud
had not occurred. These cases confirm the independent foundation
of recovery based on unjust enrichment and, as shown in the next
part, seek to develop appropriate limits on that recovery by focus-
ing on the defendant's gain and its relation to the fraud.
V. THE SEARCH FOR LIMITS ON UNJUST ENRICHMENT RECOVERY
A. General Principles
Recognizing unjust enrichment as a basis for recovery under
rule 10b-5 neither will provide a panacea for all rule 10b-5 plain-
tiffs nor negate the importance of tort based liability. The ele-
American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Va. 1980). In Nel-
son an insider, acting on behalf of a group, purchased stock from the estate of a deceased
shareholder after misrepresenting the prospects of the company. Defendant Serwold, who
made the misrepresentations, held title to the stock of the entire group of purchasers. In the
more recent Nelson decision, the Ninth Circuit limited the windfall profit recovery to the
30% of the plaintiff's stock that defendant Serwold personally received. The court refused
to hold Serwold liable for windfall profits on the 70% of the stock that he did not benefi-
cially own. The court recognized that the plaintiff could recover from Serwold for misrepre-
sentations relating to the stock, but only on a tort-based theory, which limits recovery to
that which restores plaintiff to the position plaintiff would have been in absent the fraud. In
limiting recovery under this tort theory, the court seemed to ignore the finding of the earlier
panel, which said that its result could be supported by the Janigan portion of Affiliated Ute
and also from the out of pocket portion of that rule. The earlier panel had found that ab-
sent the misrepresentation, plaintiff's shares probably would have remained in the adminis-
tration's safe deposit box as "historical curiosities" and would have been there when the
favorable sale of the company occurred six years later. Nelson, 576 F.2d at 1339 n.5. One
commentator, discussing a similar case, argued that a broader award to include the profits of
others could be justified not on unjust enrichment principles, but as an "administrative
sanction for the enforcement of rules of fiduciary conduct set by law." Jones, Unjust En-
richment and the Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty, 84 L.Q. REv. 472, 498 (quoting In re Phila-
delphia & West. R.R., 64 F. Supp. 738, 741 (E.D. Pa. 1946)).
In American General defendant's officers' misrepresentations concerning the company's
merger status induced the plaintiff to sell to the defendant corporation a 10% block of its
own stock. The corporation subsequently retired those shares so that when the corporation
subsequently merged into another corporation at a higher per share price, the benefit of the
fraud accrued to all of defendant's shareholders. The individual shareholders/defendants
received a portion of this gain, but the court assumed that the stockholders who were inno-
cent of wrongdoing would not be required to disgorge and that equity would not require the
culpable shareholders to disgorge the gain of the innocent shareholders. American General,
493 F. Supp. at 760 n.68. As so limited, the Janigan gain provided less than the recovery
based on restoring plaintiff to his prefraud position. See supra notes 113-15 and accompa-
nying text. Although the court called this measure rescissional, the theory appears to be a
disguised out of pocket/consequential recovery.
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ments of unjust enrichment recovery will not be present in many
cases and the court must base liability, if it exists at all, on tort
principles. Even when the defendant does benefit by the fraud,
tort principles may provide the preferred method of recovery if
plaintiff's loss exceeds the defendant's gain traceable to the viola-
tion. Courts therefore must consider unjust enrichment as one of
two alternative, independent bases of obligation that provide re-
covery for a rule 10b-5 violation.
Fundamental to recovery based on unjust enrichment is the
requirement that a defendant acquire a benefit by reason of in-
fringing another's interest or causing a plaintiff to suffer loss.13 5
Cases may fail to provide grounds for unjust enrichment recovery
because (1) defendant received no benefit; (2) no link exists be-
tween any benefit the defendant received and the invasion of
plaintiff's interest (a fact causation analysis); or (3) even when the
defendant could not have obtained the benefit but for the viola-
tion, other intervening factors so dilute the connection that the
court as a matter of policy should not permit recovery (a legal cau-
sation analysis).
Recovery based on unjust enrichment is impossible when the
defendant receives no benefit,', so the court need not consider the
difficult question of whether the benefit is linked to the fraud. For
example, in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,1 37 the defendant
received no tangible benefit from its misleading press release be-
cause it did not engage in any stock trading. Nevertheless, the
court held that the action caused harm to the plaintiffs; and al-
lowed them to recover under tort law principles, which operate in-
dependently of any gain by the wrongdoer.
When benefit to the defendant clearly exists, a court next
must determine whether the fraud was a factor in permitting de-
fendant to obtain the benefit. Courts in some cases deny unjust
enrichment recovery because the alleged violation has no factual
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983).
136. Benefit in securities cases usually is easy to identify in the form of money paid
for securities or services, such as brokerage commissions. In restitution, however, benefit can
have a meaning much broader than the consideration directly transferred in a transaction.
See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 13, at § 1.8. Thus, future securities cases may raise more
questions about the definition of benefit than have been addressed until now. Reprosystem
B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1984) (no unjust enrichment recovery because no
benefit).
137. 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). See supra notes 54 &
111-19.
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connection to the gain. In SEC v. Wills' the Commission sought
return of compensation received from a corporation by certain of
its officers who had violated the proxy regulations. The court
found that the compensation was unrelated to the securities viola-
tion because the SEC failed to demonstrate the requisite causal
link. The SEC did not show that with full disclosure the corpora-
tion would have fired the officers or that their compensation was
attributable to securities violations rather than some legitimate
source.
13 9
Once a court establishes the existence of both a benefit and its
cause in fact relationship to the violation, the court next must con-
sider the most difficult question-whether, for policy reasons it
should impose any other limit in the nature of a legal causation
requirement. Courts in restitution cases impose policy limits simi-
lar to tort "proximate cause" limitations.'4 0 Courts, however, must
resist the temptation to transfer to restitution the substance of
proximate cause developed in tort because the policies that under-
lie the limitations in each area are entirely different.'
The most developed of the legal cause limitations in restitu-
tion is the Janigan "artist" exception, when the intervening force
of defendant's individual efforts breaks the connection between the
gain and the fraud.14 2 As the pattern of the courts' interpretation
of that exception illustrates, defendant's efforts must be extraordi-
nary to qualify as an intervening cause. 43 Cases subsequent to
Janigan also offer some specific suggestions about when interven-
ing causes will be sufficient to invoke the exception. Courts have
held that market changes, natural commercial growth, and wind-
falls from external sources do not break the connection of the gain
138. 472 F. Supp. 1250 (D.D.C. 1978).
139. Id. at 1276; see also SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y.
1976) (requiring one defendant to return gain that came from sponsoring others to buy un-
registered securities; the court allowed a second defendant whose gain came from working in
the retail, rather than the promotional, side of the operation to keep his salary), affd, 556
F.2d 559 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977). But see Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. John-
son, 498 F.2d 186, 193 (6th Cir. 1974) (court refused to make defendants disgorge profits for
issuing misleading proxy statements and held that misleading proxies which may have re-
sulted in defendant's election to receive compensation in the form of stock in lieu of cash
were not a sufficient connection).
140. See W. PROSSER, supra note 11, § 42. Professor Prosser termed the word "proxi-
mate" unfortunate because it places the wrong emphasis on the concept, but he despaired of
any prospect that the term would be changed. Id.
141. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text
142. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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with the fraud. 14 On the other hand, some cases suggest that the
passage of time should be a limiting factor,145 while others suggest
that plaintiff's "consumption" of either a speculative opportunity
or a tax benefit should break the connection.
146
The generalizations and confusion that accompany the search
for legal cause in tort law, will plague the struggle to establish
these limits. As in tort law, courts best can work out legal cause in
restitution on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, the wholesale im-
portation of precedents or rationales from tort law will lead only to
improper limits on restitution recovery. Many of the policies that
shape the legal causation limits in tort do not have the same effect
when unjust enrichment is the basis for recovery. Courts impose
proximate cause limits in tort law in part to prevent draconian lia-
bility for violations. 47 The liability problem is not nearly so severe
in restitution because the defendant's gain places a natural ceiling
on the amount of recovery. In addition, limits in tort sometimes
rest on a fear of imposing too great a liability for mere negli-
144. Id.
145. See Thomas v. Duralite, 524 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1975); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo,
Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). In Thomas the court expressed an unwillingness to assess
damages for an indefinite period of time in the future, but actually based its reversal of the
lower court's decision on the grounds that the trial judge did not consider adequately the
defendants' special efforts and talents contributed after the fraudulent transaction, a reason
that illustrates the more traditional view of the Janigan exception. Id. at 587, 589. Defen-
dants purchased plaintiff's 47/2 % interest in two companies, subsequently resold at a profit,
and then received additional compensation through a later renegotiation of the resale agree-
ment. The district court awarded the plaintiff his proportional interest of the defendant's
cumulative proceeds under the agreement as modified. Id. at 583. The circuit court sug-
gested that the reason for the additional compensation contained in the modified agreement
was the individual talents of the two defendants, who had become very important employees
to the acquiring company. Id. at 587-88. Under these facts, the additional compensation is
not something that the defendants gained by fraud, but something they likely would have
obtained anyway. The defendants did not receive the additional compensation at the plain-
tiff's expense and therefore the plaintiff should not recover this in restitution.
The Fourth Circuit adopted a similar approach in Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan
& Assoc., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974). The purchaser of
100% of the stock of an insurance company complained of fraud by the seller and sought
rescission based on Janigan. The court focused on the defendant's gain in the transaction
and found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the defendant gained a benefit in the trans-
action that the defendant would not have been in a position to secure had no fraud oc-
curred. Id. at 1265. The court viewed the plaintiff as having paid too high a price and im-
plicitly concluded that the plaintiff would have overpaid by the same amount for a defect-
free company. Id.
146. See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text. One commentator suggests that
recovery "will be limited to benefits that can fairly be regarded as the product of the legally
protected interest." 1 G. PALMER, supra note 13, at § 3.3.
147. See W. PROSSEnR, supra note 11, § 41.
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gence. 148 This concern lessens when rule 10b-5 is the basis for re-
covery because scienter is necessary for liability under the rule.
149
The different policies governing unjust enrichment recovery sug-
gest, therefore, that the connection between the gain and the viola-
tion need not be as close as the connection between the plaintiff's
loss and the fraud required for recovery in tort.
Application of these general principles to two more specific ar-
eas, the recent decision in SEC v. MacDonald150 and open market
insider trading cases, illustrates current uses of unjust enrichment
concepts.
B. SEC v. MacDonald
Courts seeking to develop limits on unjust enrichment should
focus on the defendant's gain and its relation to the misrepresenta-
tion. In contrast, the most recent limit to Janigan, the First Cir-
cuit's 1983 decision in SEC v. MacDonald, focuses instead on the
causal link between the plaintiff's injuries and the defendant's mis-
representation, which leads to consideration of factors more appro-
priate to tort recovery. The defendant in MacDonald, the chair-
man of an ailing real estate investment trust, purchased stock in
the trust based on his inside knowledge that the trust was about to
enter into a favorable lease with a new tenant.151 The SEC brought
suit under rule 10b-5 and the trial court required defendant to dis-
gorge the $53,012 profit realized on the subsequent sale of the
stock.152 The First Circuit, however, reversed the trial court's deci-
sion on the question of the amount of restitution. The court of ap-
peals phrased the issue as whether a corporate officer in possession
of material inside information who fraudulently purchased com-
pany stock must "disgorge the entire profits he realized from his
subsequent sale of those securities. . .[or] an amount representing
the increased value of the shares at a reasonable time after public
dissemination of the information;"15 the court chose the second
alternative.
148. Id. at 237.
149. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976) (10b-5 requires
more than negligence). The court did not decide whether recklessness would suffice.
150. 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983).
151. Id. at 48.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 52. The court also noted that the defendant undertook no actions that
increased the value of the stock and that "there were no special circumstances affecting
what should be the normal result in this situation." Id.
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The MacDonald court quoted the rule it had established in
Janigan, but recognized a limitation on this rule: "where the
fraudulently obtained securities are publicly traded, and hence
readily available, the defrauded sellers can recover only those ac-
cretions occurring up to a reasonable time after they discovered
the truth.'1 54 Thus, MacDonald, using restitution as the basis for
recovery, produces a result that is the equivalent of a modified out
of pocket tort measure.' 55 The American Law Institute's proposed
Federal Securities Code, which it claims is a codification of Jani-
gan, goes beyond the MacDonald result and applies a similar limi-
tation on transactions involving all securities, whether publicly
traded or not.15 6
The MacDonald result achieves a separation that has ap-
pealed to courts in other contexts. 157 Risks of change in the market
that occur within a reasonable time following the discovery of the
fraud shift to the defendants, while risks of market changes after
that time fall on the plaintiff. The MacDonald rule in effect incor-
porates into restitution various plaintiff-based recovery principles
from contract and tort law, such as the avoidance of loss and miti-
gation of damages, which prevent the plaintiff from recovering for
any harm he reasonably could have prevented. Yet these plaintiff-
based principles simply are not as adaptable to restitution with its
focus on the defendant as they are to contract and tort law, which
look to the plaintiff's harm.
Restitution seeks to prevent unjust enrichment by requiring
defendant to give back any benefit obtained by fraud. Once the
plaintiff shows loss or interference with his interest, the court
154. Id. at 53. The court found support for this limitation in the proposed Federal
Securities Code. Id. Judge Aldrich, who authored Janigan, also wrote the First Circuit's
opinion in MacDonald.
155. The modified out of pocket cases and some cases applying a rescissory measure of
damages come to the same result. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
156. FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1708(a) introductory comment (Proposed Official
Draft 1980) states: "This codifies Janigan recognizing these cases didn't have to deal with a
cut-off date for defendant's resale." The Code provides a defrauded plaintiff with a choice of
damages or rescission, but it defines the alternatives to produce normally a mathematical
equivalence. Id. § 1708 introductory comment 5(c). It achieves this equivalence by having
both measures use the reasonable time after discovery of the fraud. The Code spares the
plaintiff the difficulty of proving that the change in value after the transaction date is caus-
ally related to the fraud, but the plaintiff cannot shift to defendant the risk of any change in
the market after a reasonable time following discovery, even though this would occur under
what the comments refer to as "unadulterated rescission." Id. When securities are not ac-
tively traded, discovery of the fraud may offer the plaintiff little opportunity to take protec-
tive action.
157. See supra note 8.
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should emphasize the connection between the defendant's subse-
quent profit and the fraud. The defendant should have the oppor-
tunity to prove that he would have obtained the benefit even with-
out the fraud-for example, that he would have purchased the
stock at the higher price once full disclosure had been made."'8 Ab-
sent such proof, however, the court should make no deduction in
the recovery.
The primary impetus for the limitation in MacDonald appears
to be the court's concern that absent the limit a plaintiff will spec-
ulate at defendant's expense. 159 Plaintiffs' choices between rescis-
sion and an out of pocket measure of recovery already provide
some opportunity for speculation, but the MacDonald court seems
to be concerned about speculation that continues after discovery of
the fraud.160 In earlier common-law cases, courts dealt with such
concerns through the doctrine of laches and, to some extent, elec-
tion of remedies. If a plaintiff attempted to engage in speculation
by delaying unreasonably a demand for rescission, courts consid-
ered plaintiff to have affirmed the contract and allowed him to sue
only for damages.'' In unjust enrichment terms any gain to the
158. This argument will precipitate the same speculative criticisms leveled previously
at decisions which assumed that a defrauded seller would have held the securities until the
subsequent resale by the fraudulent purchaser but for the fraud. See supra note 123. These
assertions inherently are after the fact justifications and difficult to prove. Defendant would
have the best chance of disproving the existence of a connection in a case like Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956), in
which the court could find some objective evidence of what a nonfraudulent party would
have done. Defendants in Speed acquired plaintiff's stock without disclosing the liquidation
value of the company's principal asset, which the insiders-defendants knew the corporation
planned to liquidate. The court, however, did not award plaintiffs all that defendants gained
at liquidation. The court found that even if there had been full disclosure, plaintiffs would
have sold their stock. Nevertheless, a disinterested Board would have called the plaintiff's
Class A shares, as permitted by the company's by-laws. The plaintiffs would have then con-
verted their Class A shares to Class B shares, also as permitted by the by-laws, and could
recover the liquidation rights of Class B shareholders. All other gain was benefit that the
majority shareholder would have had even if there had been full disclosure.
A defendant in a case like MacDonald, however, will have difficulty demonstrating ben-
efit in the absence of fraud because independent evidence seldom will exist to show that he
would have purchased at the higher, nonfraudulently induced price. Nevertheless, as a party
who has acted fraudulently, defendant should not expect the benefit of presumptions. See
Comment, supra note 123, at 282 n.34.
159. 699 F.2d at 53. A three judge panel originally decided MacDonald, but the full
five judge court then vacated that judgment and set an en banc hearing. The court's order
specifically asked the parties to address this issue.
160. Id.
161. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy
Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 505 (Del. 1981) (rejects a mitigation limitation on rescissory measure of
damages for a controlling shareholder's breach of a fiduciary duty).
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defendant from a change in the market following affirmance is not
unjust because plaintiff no longer is innocent and deserving of eq-
uity's protection. Only in this limited way are the conduct of the
plaintiff and related doctrines like the avoidance of loss and miti-
gation of damages relevant in determining whether the benefit re-
ceived from the fraud is unjust enrichment.
The MacDonald court's reliance on Baumel v. Rosen' as sup-
port for its rule, therefore, is misplaced. The plaintiff in Baumel
engaged in conscious speculation by waiting eighteen months after
notice of the fraud before filing suit.1 63 In a Baumel situation, a
plaintiff should not be able to claim defendant's subsequent gain
as unjust enrichment; but if a plaintiff promptly makes a request
for rescission the risk of any additional adverse change in the mar-
ket until the time of judgment should remain on the defendant, as
it always has in rescission cases.
The MacDonald court unnecessarily extended the Baumel
rule to facts where no indication of speculation existed."" Failure
to "cover" by itself should not lead a court to consider plaintiff as
no longer innocent and the defendant's benefit as no longer unjust;
the traditional rule in rescission mandating a prompt demand for
return of any profit should be enough. A requirement for cover
puts obligations on a plaintiff not consistent with his position as
the defrauded party. A defrauded seller forced to cover probably
will have to obtain more funds than he received in the fraudulent
transaction because the fraud's usual effect in these cases is to
cause the price to be too low while the fraud remains undiscov-
ered.16 5 In addition, the cover requirement may impose on a de-
162. 412 F.2d 571, 576 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970).
163. Id. at 574.
164. SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d at 53. MacDonald cites Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d
571 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970), and two other cases for its rule, but
none of these is clear precedent for the MacDonald decision. Another case that the Mac-
Donald court cited, Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied
404 U.S. 1004 (1971), also is not on point because it concerned no gain to the defend-
ant-only loss to the plaintiffs resulting from the defendant's violation. The last of the three
cases relied on in MacDonald, Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973),
applies a limit similar to MacDonald, but was decided under § 14 of the 1934 Act and its
negligence standard of scienter. 478 F.2d at 1298. Courts have not treated so well defen-
dants found liable under the more severe scienter standard of rule 10b-5.
165. See Note, Damages for SEC Rule 10b-5 Violations, 49 Tx. L. REv. 1141, 1148-49
81971) (similar cover problem raised by Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971)). The same disadvantage does not affect de-
frauded purchasers, and, therefore, may be a stronger argument to require them to take
action; on the other hand, there may be tax consequences or other factors that courts should
not force innocent plaintiffs to bear. In an open-market situation like MacDonald, deter-
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frauded seller an affirmative obligation to track a company after
defendant has fraudulently purchased the plaintiff's ownership po-
sition in the company, thus removing the primary incentive for the
defrauded seller to follow the company's progress.16 The result of
a cover requirement focuses too much on the plaintiff, creating a
presumption against him when doubts should be resolved against
the fraudulent party. The defendant should have the responsibility
of taking the necessary action by returning the profits or buying an
additional number of shares in the same company. Alternatively,
defendant could seek to require plaintiff to make an election of
remedies; having elected rescission, the plaintiff could not later
seek a better return in out of pocket damages if the subsequent
profits later fade away.167
Other courts in rule 10b-5 cases express concern similar to
that in MacDonald and reduce awards by any perceived benefit to
the plaintiff, such as the opportunity to speculate at the defend-
ant's expense. For example, courts have allowed a reduction in the
amount awarded in rescission to reflect the tax benefits received by
the plaintiffs from a real estate tax shelter 6 ' or the overall market
decline during the period between the transaction and the discov-
ery of the fraud.""9
Another court denied rescission because the plaintiff retained
the potential to reap huge speculative profits during the time that
the fraud was undiscovered.1 7 0 By the time the plaintiff did dis-
cover the fraud, a weakening economy had foreclosed any possibil-
ity of speculative profit. The court termed rescission "grossly ineq-
mining whether the plaintiff class is speculating will be more difficult than in a case like
Baumel. This distinction may support a different rule for open-market plaintiffs, but in any
event the burden should be on the defendant and the courts should not simply assume that
the plaintiffs are speculating.
166. See Comment, supra note 123, at 289. A "cover" obligation also forces a plaintiff
to continue dealing with a company that has defrauded him when a reasonable investor
might decide that the prudent course is to avoid such companies as untrustworthy.
167. Courts historically have misused the election of remedies to limit claims based on
unjust enrichment and currently do not favor restrictive application of the doctrine. See 1
G. PALMER, supra note 13, § 2.4. Nevertheless, election of remedies still seems proper in
these situations. Id. § 3.10. See also Jones, supra note 93, at 459.
168. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1982).
169. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978). See also supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
170. Bridgen v. Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048, 1057 (S.D. Tex. 1978). See also Hickman v.
Groesbeck, 389 F. Supp. 769, 780 (D. Utah 1974) (rejecting rescission for lack of promptness:
"To [allow recovery here] would allow plaintiffs to reap significant tax benefits while specu-
lating on the future of their venture and then return to them the value of their initial in-
vestment when the venture failed.")
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uitable" because it would
treat them as if they had placed their money in a risk-free federally insured
savings and loan. . . Plaintiff's position is like that of a player at a roulette
wheel who pays for the speculative chance of making a large gain and then




This argument goes too far. A similar argument can be made to
deny any plaintiff a choice for rescission. By the time the fraud is
discovered, if any time has passed, the plaintiff has had the oppor-
tunity to see which way the market is going.
Case law traditionally has recognized that depreciation in the
value of the stock neither makes a tender insufficient nor causes
unjust enrichment to the plaintiff.17 2 While stock that is returned
no longer represents the same bundle of risks as when it was trans-
ferred originally, the plaintiff did not cause the shift of risk. Simi-
larly, the decisions reducing recovery by the tax benefit are not
consistent with the principles of unjust enrichment. The plaintiff
who receives a tax benefit obtains his advantage from the govern-
ment, not from the defendant. Between the plaintiff and defend-
ant, defendant surely cannot make greater claim to this benefit ac-
quired from a third party.17 3 In addition, the government can take
care of itself, requiring the plaintiff upon rescission to recapture
some of the tax deductions as income.7 4
These decisions focus too much on the plaintiff and impose on
the innocent party the risk of any uncertainty in meeting the judi-
cial standards. Focusing on the defendant and resolving doubts
against the party committing the fraud is consistent with the law
of restitution and with the dual deterrent/compensatory purposes
of the federal securities laws. Restitution does not ignore advan-
tages to the plaintiff; it requires him to return or otherwise account
for what he received in the transaction to prevent the plaintiff's
171. Bridgen, 456 F. Supp. at 1058.
172. See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 13, § 3.12.
173. See, e.g., Spatz v. Borenstein, 513 F. Supp. 571, 584 (N.D. IM. 1981) (section 12
rescission not limited by plaintiff's tax benefit); Western Fed. Corp. v. Davis, FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 99,117 (D. Ariz. Dec. 23, 1982).
174. See Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 1984) (court "declines
to make the government the banker for fraudulent tax shelter activity," presuming that the
"IRS will do its duty if the [plaintiffs] should actually recover on their judgments and there-
after fail to file amended returns as required by law"); see generally Note, Real Estate
Limited Partnerships and Allocational Efficiency: The Incentive to Sue for Securities
Fraud, 63 VA. L. Rav. 669 (1977) (compares tax consequences of suing for damages and
rescission).
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unjust enrichment. 17 5 The standard for determining unjust enrich-
ment, however, varies according to whether a court focuses on the
innocent party or the "fraudfeasor." The degree of restoration re-
quired takes into account the fault of the parties, assuring that the
fraudfeasor rather than the innocent party will carry the risk of
any uncertainty in linking the gain/loss to the violation.
C. Open-Market Insider Trading
Open-market insider trading cases illustrate the difference be-
tween restitution and tort in connecting the benefit or loss to the
breach. These cases present analytical difficulties from both a tort
and an unjust enrichment perspective, but make more sense if
viewed from an unjust enrichment perspective.
The federal courts interpret rule 10b-5 to require an insider in
possession of material information to either disclose the informa-
tion or refrain from trading.176 When a defendant's breach involves
trading on the open market, finding plaintiffs who have sustained
losses that can be linked to the insider's conduct within traditional
tort doctrines is difficult. Those traders on the other side of the
transaction from the insider may have sustained losses, but given
the anonymous nature of the market few, if any, can show that
their trading was induced by defendant's fraudulent conduct. In
almost all cases plaintiffs made decisions to trade that were inde-
pendent of the defendant;17 7 these plaintiffs would have suffered
the same losses had the defendant simply not traded and not dis-
closed-action that would not have been a breach of defendant's
rule 10b-5 duty."7 8 Some courts therefore find no causal connection
175. See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 13, § 3.12.
176. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). See generally 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURrrIEs AND FEDERAL CORPO-
RATE LAW § 9.08 (rev. perm. ed. 1983); W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRAD-
ING (1968).
177. The extent to which a plaintiff can claim that defendant's silence induced the
conduct is discussed infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text. Apart from such an argu-
ment some plaintiffs possibly may prove that defendant's trade induced the loss. This could
occur, for example, if defendant's buying increased demand for the stock leading to a rise in
price, which caused plaintiff to sell. Alternatively, the insiders may have preempted buyers
who otherwise would have bought. See Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information
on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule
10b-52, 54 S. CAL. L. RE v. 1217, 1230-45 (1981). Even if these harms do exist, identifying
traders who fit into either class to establish a class of plaintiffs is practically impossible. Id.
at 1236-40.
178. In most insider trading situations the duty is clearly in the alternative; it is no
violation to remain silent so long as there is no trading. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401
F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In that situation,
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between plaintiff's loss and defendant's breach and deny any pri-
vate recovery.179
Other courts focus not on the trade but on the nondisclosure
and sometimes hold that defendant's silence caused the plaintiff's
subsequent trade. Under this view, if defendant has a duty to
speak, the plaintiff can connect his trading loss to defendant's
breach by alleging that the plaintiff would not have traded at the
price if he had possessed all essential information.1i 0 The effect is
to make insiders responsible for the failure of the price to reflect
the undisclosed information and therefore the ensuing loss. 8 ' At
common law defendant's duty to speak (and responsibility for sub-
sequent trading losses) arose from the fiduciary duty of a director
when a shareholder relied on the director's trustworthiness in en-
tering into a transaction with the director182 or would have relied
on the director's trustworthiness had he known of the director's
involvement (which the director went to great lengths to
disguise).8 "
When public, impersonal markets permitted directors to trade
on nonpublic information with their shareholders or prospective
shareholders without the need for a disguise, the Second Circuit in
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith was unwilling
to let insiders take advantage of the informational imbalance and
extended the duty to speak to forge the necessary causal connec-
tion between defendant's silence and plaintiff's trade. 84 But the
courts generally defer to the corporation's business judgment in not releasing information
immediately. See State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981).
179. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053
(1977).
180. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
181. One commentator has termed such a responsibility a "quasi-Samaritan duty,"
leading to a causation anomaly. See Wang, supra note 177, at 1240-45. See also Dooley,
Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1, 21 (1980).
182. Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932).
183. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). In Strong an insider purchased stock from
a shareholder through her agent whose office was next door to defendant's. Instead of deal-
ing directly, defendant used two intermediaries. The court said the agent would not have
sold had he known the defendant was buying. The court imposed a duty when "special
facts" existed that included the concealment of identity plus defendants specific involve-
ment in negotiations that led to favorable developments for the company.
184. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974). See BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONs 216 (1946) ("Dishonest directors should not find
absolution from retributive justice by concealing their identity from their victims under the
mask of the stock exchange. The basis of such liability is abuse of official position for per-
sonal profit to the detriment of those whom he was under a duty to protect.")
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Shapiro court felt that to extend the insiders' duty only to the
trader who was fortuitously matched with the insider (and often
could not be identified) would "make a mockery of the 'disclose or
abstain' rule" and would "frustrate a major purpose of the an-
tifraud provisions of the [federal] securities laws: to insure the in-
tegrity and efficiency of the securities markets."185 Therefore the
court held that the duty runs to all those trading in the market
during the same period opposite from the insiders.'86
The theory developed by the Shapiro court creates the possi-
bility of draconian liabilities for the insider because almost any
trader will be able to say that he would not have traded if he had
known the information. The breadth of potential liability caused
even the Shapir6 court to pause before awarding the damages that
would flow from it. 8 7 Viewed from a tort damages perspective, the
remedial choice in insider trading cases is either that no one will
recover or that the imposition of a very broad duty with its pre-
sumption of causation will enable a very large group to recover.
The latter, however, will require reasoning that may substantially
distort tort damages principles.
Unjust enrichment principles offer a different approach that
avoids some of these problems. The goal is not to show that plain-
tiff's losses are proximately related to defendant's violation or that
plaintiff is recovering what plaintiff would have been in a position
to gain if there had been no fraud. Rather, the guiding principle is
to make the defendant give back that which he obtained by inva-
sion of the plaintiff's interest whether or not that gain equals the
plaintiff's loss. In such an approach the defendant's gain serves as
a natural built-in limit which prevents draconian liability for the
defendant. The most difficult question is one of standing: Which
plaintiffs have rights that the defendant has infringed to entitle
them to recover the gain made by the defendants? At least three
groups are possible: (1) the person in privity with the insider; (2)
all shareholders disadvantaged by lack of information; and (3) the
corporation.
Courts that use a tort damages perspective are likely to limit
standing to persons in privity with the insider. This approach also
185. Id. at 236-37.
186. Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 241.
187. The Second Circuit left it to the district court to determine the proper measure
of damage and suggested that "the nature and character of the Rule 10b-5 violations com-




draws some support from the traditional common law governing
rescission.""8 In an open-market setting, however, with the practi-
cal difficulty in matching buyers and sellers in a stock exchange
transaction this limitation probably will prevent any plaintiffs
from being able to recover. 8 " This result is consistent with the
view of those who believe that the prohibitory scope of rule 10b-5
is broader than the private rights it creates.190
Several courts and commentators justify a larger class of
plaintiffs that would include all shareholders disadvantaged by the
lack of information produced by the fraud. The Second Circuit in
Shapiro concluded that an insider's duty to disclose or abstain ex-
tends to all those trading in the market during the same period."1
In restitution terms, this is a finding that the defendant's breach
infringes not just the interests of the trader who happened to be
opposite the insider, but also all the interests of those in the mar-
ket during the same period. The recognition that those other trad-
ers have interests that the defendant can infringe comes from the
court's conclusion that the duty to disclose is necessary to preserve
the integrity of the securities markets.
The proposed Federal Securities Code permits recovery by a
similar class of plaintiffs, providing that the court shall divide the
award pro rata among applicable plaintiffs.1 92 The commentary ex-
plicitly recognizes the restitution basis for the obligation: "The
theory, again, is compensation if practicable but in any event de-
terrence and avoidance of unjust enrichment."193 More recently,
other courts and commentators have supported both the unjust en-
richment rationale of the recovery and disadvantaged shareholders
as an appropriate class of plaintiffs. 9 '
188. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
189. See Wang, supra note 177, at 1236-37.
190. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 320 (6th Cir. 1976) (rejecting view that "civil
remedy must invariably be coextensive in its reach with the reach of the SEC, which under
the Act, was designated by the Congress as the primary vehicle of its enforcement"), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Dooley, supra note 181, at 71 (Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222 (1980), "[sluggests that the prohibitory scope of [10b-5] is broader than the private
rights it creates, but this is neither novel nor unexpected in a regulatory system that has
been fashioned piecemeal.").
191. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
192. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE §§ 1703b, 1708(b), 1711 (1980) (defendant liable
for damages to persons who buy or sell from the day defendant first unlawfully buys until
the day when all material facts become generally available; liability limited to amount de-
fendant sold or bought with recovery prorated among plaintiffs if necessary).
193. Id. § 1711(j) introductory comment 7(a).
194. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). Langevoort,
Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L.
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Expanding the class of plaintiffs to that suggested by Shapiro
will create the procedural complications attendant to class actions.
Individual plaintiffs may receive pro rata recoveries that are not
equal to the expense of the suit or the allocation procedure.195 Sev-
eral writers, seeking a readily available plaintiff without these
problems, have suggested that the corporation itself may be the
most appropriate plaintiff.9 " The New York Court of Appeals
adopted a similar position in Diamond v. Oreamuno.1 97 The court
in Diamond, using an unjust enrichment theory, permitted the cor-
poration to recover an insider's trading gains. The court recognized
as the "primary concern" the question "as between the corporation
and the defendants, who has a higher claim to the pro-
ceeds .. ."19 Other courts have refused to accept the New York
court's common-law basis for a corporation's right to sue,199 but
even apart from the resolution of that debate the corporate plain-
tiff has another problem establishing standing when suing under
rule 10b-5. Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs must be actual purchasers or sell-
ers of securities. °0 Since in many insider trading cases the corpora-
tion itself was not in the market at the same time as the insider,
the corporation may not be able to satisfy this threshold for stand-
ing. The proposal of the corporation as plaintiff, therefore, usually
comes in the context of suggestions for changes in the securities
statute. 01
Proponents of both the disadvantaged shareholders and the
corporation as rule 10b-5 plaintiffs agree that in an open market
context the insider trading prohibition is not designed to compen-
REv. 1, 19-38 (1982) (preventing unjust enrichment is objective underlying the open-market
duty to disclose).
195. See Karjala, Statutory Regulation of Insider Trading in Impersonal Markets,
1982 DUKE L.J. 627, 639-40. The ALI provides for alternative recovery to the corporation or
the Securities Investor Protection Corp. when the trial court determines that the expense of
making the proration, in relation to the amount to be awarded individual plaintiffs, does not
warrant making the proration. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1711(j).
196. See, e.g., Karjala, supra note 195, at 641-44; Knauss, Disclosure Require-
ments-Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 Bus. LAw. 43, 58-59 (1968); Ratner, Federal and
State Roles in the Regulation of Insider Trading, 31 Bus. LAw. 947, 957-60 (1976); Note, A
Re-Evaluation of Federal and State Regulation of Insider Trading on the Open Securities
Market, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 915, 941-43 (1980).
197. Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
198. Id. at 498, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81, 248 N.E.2d at 912.
199. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d
739 (Fla. 1975).
200. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
201. See Karjala, supra note 195, at 641-44; Ratner, supra note 196, at 960; Note,
supra note 196, at 943.
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sate injured victims as tort damages do. Instead, the prohibition is
aimed at preventing insiders' unjust enrichment. 202 Allowing either
group as plaintiffs could achieve this purpose. The claim of either
group as the appropriate recipient of the enrichment does not rest
explicitly on a contractual or other traditional common-law con-
nection to defendant,203 but on a finding by the courts such as in
Shapiro that the protection of the securities market requires that
plaintiffs have a right to expect that insiders will not take advan-
tage of their position to trade. 04 A plaintiff class that includes
those traders in the market at the same time as the insider satisfies
the standing rule requiring an actual purchaser or seller and is con-
sistent with the purposes of the securities laws as expressed in
Shapiro.
Decisions such as Elkind v. Liggett & Myers205 reflect the use
by federal courts of traditional unjust enrichment principles to im-
plement the broad remedial purposes of the securities laws, but the
Elkind court's conclusion that gain is a requirement of rule 10b-5
liability is an overstatement. Some rule 10b-5 cases are supported
by both tort and unjust enrichment rationales and some are sup-
ported by one but not the other. Elkind can be supported on un-
just enrichment grounds even if tort grounds are not present.
Elkind illustrates that the connection between the plaintiff and
the defendant need not be as strong when a court imposes liability
based on the defendant's unjust enrichment as when liability is
based on compensating loss to the plaintiff. Open market insider
trading cases stretch tort causation principles beyond limits most
courts are willing to go, while on the alternative restitution
grounds recovery does not raise the same concerns.
The unjust enrichment solution is not without defects because
it provides little deterrence to an insider.0 " The defendant knows
that if he is caught, he simply must hand back what he gained, and
that if he is not caught, he will make a handsome profit.207 Resolu-
202. See Karjala, supra note 195, at 639; Langevoort, supra note 194, at 19-38.
203. See Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 326 n.11 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze, J.,
concurring) ("mechanics of the market necessitate designation of the class of contemporane-
ous investors as surrogate plaintiffs for those who actually traded"), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1053 (1977). But see Dooley, supra note 181, at 21 (public investors function as a practical,
if illogical surrogate).
204. See supra note 186 and accompanying text; see also Fridrich v. Bradford, 542
F.2d at 326 (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
205. 635 F.2d 156, 172 (2d Cir. 1980).
206. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 123, at 291.
207. Both the ALI and SEC have suggested legislative changes to meet this fault. See
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tion will have to await legislative enactment because neither tort
nor unjust enrichment theories seem capable of providing a better
solution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since 1974 the Supreme Court has restricted the reach of the
private cause of action implied under rule 10b-5.20 In that context,
lower courts seeking to determine the appropriate measure of dam-
ages have found the familiar tort concept of proximate cause to be
a useful tool in preventing a plaintiff from shifting to the defend-
ant the risk of market change subsequent to the fraudulent trans-
action. Some courts have suggested that there can be no liability
under rule 10b-5 unless the misrepresentation is the proximate
cause of the loss. These statements give too narrow a view to the
purposes of the rule and fail to recognize adequately its unjust en-
richment ancestry. The statements must be limited to cases in
which grounds for unjust enrichment recovery do not exist and in
which recovery, if the court is to find it at all, can be based only on
tort theory. Unfortunately, this narrow vision has spilled over to
cases in which a basis for unjust enrichment recovery does exist.
The courts' inability to deal consistently with recovery that they
consider to be based on rescission or a rescissory measure of dam-
ages evidences this "spill over." Courts often view these measures
of recovery in tort terms, overlooking the principles of unjust en-
richment that distinguish rescission and monetary awards that are
the financial equivalents of rescission from the tort based out of
pocket or consequential damages recoveries. As a result of this
tort-influenced view, courts often mangle theories when plaintiffs
seek to recover windfall profits based on unjust enrichment
principles.
When courts recognize unjust enrichment as a principle justi-
fying recovery under rule 10b-5 separate and apart from tort prin-
ciples, they clarify their decisions that deal with rescission and the
Janigan measure of recovery. Unjust enrichment as a separate the-
ory of recovery also provides a better foundation to consider the
more difficult problems raised in open-market insider trading
FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1708 introductory comment 5(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1980);
Inside Trading Sanction Act of 1983 (currently before Congress).
208. Since 1974 the Supreme Court has limited the reach of 10b-5 in a variety of ways,
most recently in Dirks v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983). See generally Whitaker &
Rotch, The Supreme Court and the Counter-Revolution in Securities Regulation, 30 ALA.
L. REv. 335 (1979).
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cases. Courts therefore should recognize and apply the distinction
between the tort and unjust enrichment theories to carry out the
purposes of the rule 10b-5 action.
